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1

Introduction

One of the most common criticisms leveled against the media is that they strategically
distort news to pursue their private interests and affect political outcomes.1 To counter
the threat posed by the spread of disinformation, most countries enforce laws that punish
the practice of misreporting information. Consider for example the United Kingdom’s
Representation of the People Act 1983 (Chapter 2, Part II, Section 106):
A person who, or any director of any body [...] which – (a) before or during an
election, (b) for the purpose of affecting the return of any candidate at the election,
makes or publishes any false statement of fact in relation to the candidate’s personal
character or conduct shall be guilty of an illegal practice.

More recently, several governments have passed “fake news laws” to address the growing
concern about distortions of the political process caused by disinformation. Most of these
efforts revolve around the idea of affecting media outlets’ costs of misreporting information
through, e.g., fines, jail terms, and awareness campaigns (Funke & Famini, 2018).2
This class of interventions is relevant not only because of its recent popularity, but
also because it seeks to steer the conduct of media outlets without interfering with the
markets’ concentration levels. In “news markets” a single outlet with private possession of
some information is in fact a monopolist over that particular piece of news. This is often
the case with scoops, scandals, and “October surprises.” Since breaking news spreads
fast, even small outlets can reach a large audience when endowed with a scoop that
can swing the outcome of an election.3 In these circumstances, interventions that affect
the costs of misreporting information might still discipline the behavior of those media
outlets with exclusive possession of political news. Despite its relevance, the regulation
of misreporting costs is currently understudied, and to date there is no formal model
exploring its consequences.4
In this paper, I study the welfare effects of regulatory interventions that impose costs
on media outlets for misreporting information. The key idea is that the implications
of media bias are not confined to distortions of voters’ choice at the ballot box, but
spread and propagate back to the process of policy-making. Ahead of elections, competing
candidates face a choice between gathering popular consensus with “populist” policies that
1

This concern is substantiated by empirical evidence that media bias has an impact on voting behavior
(see, e.g., DellaVigna & Kaplan, 2007) and by the observation that mass media are voters’ primary source
of policy-relevant information (see Gottfried, Barthel, Shearer, & Mitchell, 2016).
2
Misreporting costs can be direct, such as the time and money required to misrepresent information,
or indirect and probabilistic, such as the loss of reputation and profits incurred by a media outlet if
caught in a lie. For more examples about “fake news laws,” see Funke and Famini (2018).
3
In the “Killian document controversy,” online blogs’ revelation that CBS aired unauthenticated and
forged documents was quickly rebroadcast by a wide spectrum of media. See Gentzkow and Shapiro
(2008) for this and other examples.
4
This is because most related work assumes that misreporting is either costless (e.g., in cheap talk
models) or not possible (e.g., in disclosure models). See Section 2 for a review of the relevant literature.
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benefit voters and seeking the endorsement of an influential media with “biased” policies
that please media outlets. Since media bias skews electoral competition and produces
distortions in policy outcomes, the informational and political effects of regulation need
to be jointly determined.
I consider a model of strategic communication between a media outlet and a representative voter, where the policy alternatives available to the voter are endogenously
championed by two competing candidates running for office. In the policy-making stage,
the two candidates – an incumbent and a challenger – sequentially and publicly make a
binding commitment to policy proposals. Afterwards, in the communication subgame, the
media outlet delivers a public news report about the candidates’ relative quality, where
“quality” is defined as a candidate’s fit with the state of the world, competence, record, etc.
Given the proposals and the outlet’s report, the voter casts a ballot for one of the two
candidates. At the end, the policy proposed by the elected candidate gets implemented.
In contrast to canonical models of strategic communication, the media outlet bears a
cost of misreporting its private information about candidates’ quality that is increasing in
the magnitude of misrepresentation. The voter and the outlet have aligned preferences
over the relative quality of candidates (hereafter just “quality”), but disagree on which
policy is the best. Therefore, when candidates advance different proposals, there are
contingencies in which there is a conflict of interest between the outlet and the voter. An
agency problem emerges, as the outlet can strategically misreport information to induce
the election of its favorite candidate and seize political gains at the expense of the voter.
The main results provide a number of policy implications by showing how the regulation
of misreporting costs affects the voter’s welfare. I find that an increase in the costs of
misreporting information never harms the voter, but that a small incremental increase
might have no effect at all on the voter’s welfare. This result implies that, when carrying
out interventions is costly, lenient regulatory efforts can be wasteful of public resources. I
obtain conditions under which the voter is better off without a media outlet or alternatively
with an “electoral silence” period that forbids the delivery of policy-relevant news ahead of
the election. I also show that there is no monotonic relationship between the probability
that persuasion takes place and the voter’s welfare, and between the probability that
persuasion takes place and the costs of misreporting information. Interventions that
increase such costs might induce more misreporting and more persuasion, and yet improve
the voter’s welfare because of the availability of better policies. Therefore, the growing
concern that “proposed anti-fake news laws [...] aggravate the root causes fuelling the fake
news phenomenon” (Alemanno, 2018) is perhaps exaggerated. This also implies that the
empirical task of inferring the efficiency of such interventions from the media’s reporting
behavior is challenging, if not impossible.
A natural question is whether politicians have the right incentives to propose inter-

4
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ventions that benefit the voter.5 To answer this question, I extend the main model by
endogenizing the process of regulating misreporting costs, which takes place ahead of the
policy-making stage. I show that the electoral incentives of politicians together with the
sequential nature of policy proposals generate a friction in the regulatory process that
results in the selection of interventions that depress the voter’s welfare. The worst-case
scenario is obtained when the incumbent government is in charge of regulation: in this
case, the incumbent sets relatively low misreporting costs that trigger the convergence of
proposals to the media outlet’s favorite policy. Even though misreporting behavior is fully
eradicated, the voter’s welfare is at its minimum because of the induced policy distortion.
From the voter’s perspective, the resulting political outcome is abysmal, and equivalent
to that of a dystopic scenario where the media outlet has the voting rights to directly
decide upon which policy to implement and which candidate to elect. The situation is
better, but still far from ideal, when the challenger is in charge of regulation.
The intuition behind the above results is as follows. As the costs of misreporting
information decrease, both candidates offer more “biased” policies in the attempt to obtain
the endorsement of an increasingly persuasive media outlet. The candidates’ proposals
become progressively closer to each other until, for sufficiently low misreporting costs,
they fully converge on the outlet’s preferred policy. More similar policies imply a smaller
conflict of interest between the voter and the media outlet, and thus persuasion can
occur in a smaller number of contingencies as costs decrease. Eventually, the convergence
of proposals eradicates any conflict of interest as in these cases the only element that
can differentiate candidates is their relative quality, over which preferences are aligned.
Somewhat paradoxically, under low misreporting costs the media outlet has high persuasive
potential and yet it fully reveals its private information about quality. However, the
voter’s welfare is at its minimum because perfect knowledge about quality—and thus
perfect selection of candidates—comes at the cost of inducing a large distortion in terms
of policies, which are furthest from the voter’s ideal bliss policy. If candidates’ quality is
sufficiently less important than their policies, then the voter might be better off without a
media outlet at all.
Since policy convergence occurs for a set of sufficiently low but positive misreporting
costs, lenient interventions might be ineffective. On the other hand, a substantial increase
in the misreporting costs might trigger policy divergence and thus increase the contingencies
in which there is a conflict of interest, making room for more misreporting and persuasion.
In these cases, the voter’s welfare increases because the loss of information about quality
and the increased electoral mistakes are more than compensated by the availability of
better policies. When misreporting costs are sufficiently high, both candidates offer more
“populist” policies to please the voter rather than the weakened media outlet. As costs
5

Most fake news laws are introduced by members of incumbent governments, ministers, or government
factions (Funke & Famini, 2018; Law Library of Congress, 2019).
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increase, the candidates’ proposals tend to converge back toward the voter’s preferred
policy, mitigating the conflict of interest and the occurrence of misreporting and persuasion.
The voter’s welfare is thus maximized by arbitrarily high misreporting costs.
To see how electoral incentives skew the process of regulation, recall that policies
are proposed sequentially. The presence of an influential media outlet transforms the
policy-making stage in a sort of sequential rock-paper-scissors game where a moderate
policy beats a populist one, a biased policy beats a moderate one, and a populist policy
beats a biased one. Given the incumbent’s proposal, the challenger has the second-mover
advantage of choosing the most profitable strategy between seeking the voter’s approval
or the media outlet’s support. When in charge of regulation, the incumbent can nullify
this “incumbency disadvantage effect” by setting low misreporting costs to force policy
convergence.6 Therefore, electoral incentives push politicians to use regulation for purely
instrumental reasons, decreasing the voter’s welfare as a result.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss the related
literature. Section 3 introduces the model, which I solve in Section 4. In Section 5, I
analyze the voter’s welfare and the process of regulation. In Section 6, I discuss the model
and its extensions, and Section 7 concludes. Formal proofs are relegated to the Appendix.

2

Related Literature

This paper is related to the literature studying the political economy of media bias.7 Papers
belonging to this literature can be broadly split into two strands: models of demand-side
and models of supply-side media bias. The first strand focuses on the case where news
organizations are profit-maximizing and/or their preferences over political outcomes are
second-order. Bias can emerge, for example, when media firms and journalists want to
develop a reputation for accurate reporting (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 2006; Shapiro, 2016),
consumers favor confirmatory news (Bernhardt, Krasa, & Polborn, 2008; Mullainathan &
Shleifer, 2005), or voters demand biased information (Calvert, 1985; Oliveros & Várdy,
2015; Suen, 2004). In the present paper I take a supply-side approach by considering a
media outlet that has preferences over political outcomes. In this second strand, bias
originates from the intrinsic preferences and motivations of agents who work for news
organizations, like editors and owners. For example, media bias occurs when journalists
have ideological leanings (Baron, 2006), media firms suppress unwelcome news (Anderson
6

There is empirical evidence of both media’s anti-incumbent behavior (Puglisi, 2011) and of an
“incumbency disadvantage” effect due to media coverage (Green-Pedersen, Mortensen, & Thesen, 2017).
However, evidence is mixed as other work finds that media has either no clear effect (Gentzkow, Shapiro, &
Sinkinson, 2011) or a positive effect on the reelection chances of incumbent politicians (Drago, Nannicini,
& Sobbrio, 2014).
7
For comprehensive surveys on the topic, see Prat and Strömberg (2013) and Gentzkow, Shapiro, and
Stone (2015).
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& McLaren, 2012; Besley & Prat, 2006), or politicians design public signals (Alonso &
Camara, 2016).
The above-mentioned papers abstract from the process of policy-making and political
competition. By contrast, I explicitly incorporate an electoral stage where candidates
compete via binding commitments to policy proposals. For this reason, the present paper
is more closely related to the stream of work studying the effects of political endorsements
on policy outcomes. Within this part of the literature but in contrast to the present
paper, G. Grossman and Helpman (1999), Gul and Pesendorfer (2012), and Chakraborty,
Ghosh, and Roy (2020) consider voters that are uncertain about their own preferences;
Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) and Boleslavsky and Cotton (2015) model the source of
information about candidates as exogenous; Andina-Dı́az (2006) models voting behavior as
exogenous; Miura (2019) considers a media outlet that delivers fully certifiable information
about candidates’ policies; Bandyopadhyay, Chatterjee, and Roy (2020), Chan and Suen
(2008), and Strömberg (2004) study a demand-side framework; Ashworth and Shotts
(2010) and Warren (2012) use a political agency framework to study how a media outlet
affects the incumbent’s incentives to pander. Differently, in this paper I use a supply-side
model where voters know their preferences; the behavior of candidates, voters, and the
media is endogenous, and information about the state can be misreported.
The most closely related paper is Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016). They use a
Downsian framework to study the welfare effects of a policy-motivated media outlet that
can influence voting behavior via cheap talk endorsements. The present paper is different
in three important aspects: first, I incorporate costs for misreporting information that are
proportional to the magnitude of misrepresentation. Under this approach, a news report
is more than just an endorsement as it constitutes a costly signal of the state. Second, I
study a sequential rather than a simultaneous model of electoral competition. As a result,
I obtain that the policy of the incumbent is subject to a different distortion than that
of the challenger. I show that this difference plays an important role when endogenizing
the process of regulation. Finally, the welfare analysis in Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016)
focuses on the ideological conflict between the media outlet and the voter, while I focus
on the intensity of misreporting costs and its regulation.
The key feature of the present paper is how communication is modeled. Papers in the
previously mentioned literature consider media outlets that either can report anything
without bearing any direct consequence on their payoffs (e.g., Chakraborty & Ghosh,
2016; Gul & Pesendorfer, 2012) or cannot misreport information at all (e.g., Besley &
Prat, 2006; Duggan & Martinelli, 2011). By contrast, I consider a media outlet that can
misreport information but at a cost. In addition to incorporating a realistic feature, this
modeling strategy allows me to perform comparative statics on misreporting costs that
are currently unexplored, yet crucial for understanding the regulation of news markets.
In this regard, Edmond and Lu (2021) constitute an exception: they analyze a model
7
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where a politician with no directional bias can manipulate information at a cost to
prevent voters from becoming well-informed. They study the effects of a shock that
increases the intrinsic precision of voters’ information and simultaneously decreases the
politician’s manipulation costs. Differently, I consider a media outlet known to prefer a
specific candidate. Importantly, here the media and voter’s preferences over candidates
are endogenously determined through a process of policy-making.
The present paper also touches upon the literature on strategic communication with
lying costs (Chen, 2011; Kartik, 2009; Kartik, Ottaviani, & Squintani, 2007; Ottaviani &
Squintani, 2006). With respect to this line of work, I consider a setting where the voter (i.e.,
the receiver) has a binary action space and the outlet (i.e., the sender) has a continuous
message space. Moreover, the alternatives available to the voter are endogenously selected
through a process of electoral competition, and not exogenously given. This framework
gives rise to a number of important qualitative differences in the amount of information
transmitted and the language used in equilibrium: I obtain equilibria where persuasion
naturally occurs even within large state and report spaces; the sender might invest costly
resources to misreport even in the (interim) absence of a conflict of interest with the
receiver; full information revelation occurs with relatively low misreporting costs.8 These
features are key and instrumental for the main results of the present paper.
Finally, Balbuzanov (2019) and Hodler, Loertscher, and Rohner (2014) identify a
non-monotonicity in the sender’s persuasiveness that is similar to the one I describe
in Section 5. In Balbuzanov (2019), a higher probability of lie-detection may decrease
the receiver’s welfare, whereas a relatively low lie-detection probability can yield full
revelation. In Hodler et al. (2014), the bound on the sender’s report space becomes tight
when misreporting costs are low, and thus the sender’s inflated messages reach the bound.
Lower misreporting costs make the sender less credible without allowing him to misreport
in more states. As a result, lower costs can be associated with less persuasion and a higher
welfare for the receiver. The non-monotonicity result I obtain is logically independent and
it has different implications on the receiver’s welfare: the voter is better off with higher
misreporting costs even when they generate more misreporting and persuasion.

3

The Model

There are four players: a representative voter v, a media outlet m, and two candidates: an
incumbent i, and a challenger c. The voter has to cast a ballot b ∈ {i, c} for one of the two
candidates. At the outset, in the “policy-making stage,” each candidate makes a binding
8

With a coarse action space, the outlet can achieve persuasion by pooling information to make the
voter indifferent between two actions. Similarly, Chen (2011) obtains “message clustering” in a setting
with a continuous action space and a coarse message space. Kartik (2009) finds partial separation in
a bounded type space setting. Kartik et al. (2007) and Ottaviani and Squintani (2006) show that full
separation is achieved when such a bound is arbitrarily large.
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The media outlet privately
observes θ and then
delivers a report r

The incumbent commits to policy qi

i

c

m

v

The voter casts a ballot
b for either the incumbent or the challenger

The challenger commits to policy qc

Policy-making stage

Communication subgame

Figure 1: Timeline of the model.

and public commitment to a policy proposal. I assume that proposals are sequential: the
incumbent first commits to a policy qi ∈ R; after observing qi , the challenger commits9 to
a policy qc ∈ R. Policy proposals q = (qi , qc ) are then publicly observed by all players. If
the voter casts a ballot b for candidate j ∈ {i, c}, then policy qj is eventually implemented.
The “communication subgame” takes place after the candidates’ commitments but
before the election: the media outlet privately observes the realization of a state θ ∈ Θ
and then delivers a news report r ∈ R. Reports are literal statements about the state.
Before casting a ballot, the voter observes the report r but not the state θ. Figure 1
illustrates the timing structure of the model.
The State. The state θ represents the relative quality of the incumbent with respect
to the challenger, and I shall hereafter refer to θ simply as “quality.” I assume that θ is
randomly drawn from a uniform density function f over Θ = [−φ, φ], where f is common
knowledge to all the players. Only the media outlet privately observes the realized θ. The
voter and the media outlet have identical preferences over quality: given any proposals
q = (qi , qc ), the higher the quality is, the higher is the gain from the incumbent winning the
election rather than the challenger. Thus, quality is an element of vertical differentiation
similar in kind to what is known in political theory as “valence.”10
Payoffs. Candidates are purely office-seeking, and care only about their own electoral
victory. I assume that candidates obtain a utility of 1 if they win and 0 otherwise. The
utility of candidate j ∈ {i, c} is thus11 uj (b) = 1{b = j}.
9

The assumption of sequentiality in the policy-making process reflects that candidates announce their
policies at distinct points in time, and that the incumbent’s policy is typically formed or known before
the challenger’s. See, e.g., Wiseman (2006).
10
Quality can capture traits like a candidate’s fit with the state of the world, competence, reputation,
evidence of good and bad conduct, etc. For a discussion of the closely related notion of valence or
character, see, e.g., Stokes (1963), Kartik and McAfee (2007), and Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016).
11
1{·} is the indicator function, where 1{A} = 1 if A is true, and 0 otherwise.
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The voter and the media outlet have a preferred “bliss” policy of ϕv ∈ R and ϕm ∈ R
respectively.12 I assume without loss of generality that ϕm < ϕv , and denote with γ > 0
a parameter weighting the relative importance of policies to quality. The voter’s utility
uv (b, θ, q) from selecting candidate b ∈ {i, c} when quality is θ and proposals are q = (qi , qc )
is an additively separable combination of standard single-peaked policy preferences and
quality, i.e.,
uv (b, θ, q) = −γ(ϕv − qb )2 + 1{b = i}θ.
Therefore, given proposals q, the voter prefers to vote for the incumbent only if quality is
high enough, i.e., θ > τv (q) = γ(2ϕv − qc − qi )(qc − qi ). The threshold τv (q) is obtained
from solving uv (i, θ, q) = uv (c, θ, q) for θ.
The media’s preferences over candidates are analogous as the voter’s. I similarly define
τm (q) = γ(2ϕm − qc − qi )(qc − qi ) and refer to τj (q) as player j’s threshold, for j ∈ {v, m}.
Given policies q and state θ, the media outlet’s preferred candidate is



i


m̂(θ, q) = c



∅

if θ > τm (q)
if θ < τm (q)
if θ = τm (q).

The media’s decision of misreporting information depends on two additional parameters.
I denote by k > 0 a scalar parameter measuring the intensity of misreporting costs, and
by ξ > 0 the gains obtained by the outlet when his preferred candidate m̂(θ, q) ends
up winning the election. The media outlet gets an overall utility of um (r, b, θ, q) when
delivering report r in state θ with proposals q and winning candidate b, where
um (r, b, θ, q) = 1{b = m̂(θ, q)}ξ − k(r − θ)2 .
Importantly, the media outlet incurs a cost of k(r − θ)2 for delivering a news report r
when the state is θ. Any report r ∈ R has the literal or exogenous meaning “quality
is equal to r.” Truthful reporting occurs when r = θ, and it is assumed to be costless.
By contrast, misreporting information is costly, and the associated costs are increasing
with the difference between the stated and the true realization of quality. The score k
encapsulates all those elements determining the magnitude of misreporting costs, such
as reputation concerns, resources required for misrepresenting information and falsifying
numbers, and the stringency of fake news laws. With some abuse of language, I will
hereafter interchangeably refer to k as “misreporting costs” or “costs’ intensity.”13
12

The model can allow for the presence of a finite committee or a continuum of voters where v is the
median voter with bliss policy ϕv . Under a majority voting rule with two alternatives, the assumption of
sincere voting is without loss of generality, as in such cases truth-telling is a dominant strategy.
13
I use the quadratic loss k(r − θ)2 to obtain a closed-form solution and to simplify exposition. To find
the equilibria of the communication subgame (Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.1), I use a more general
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Influential News. The media outlet is influential only if the voter’s sequentially
rational decision is not constant along the equilibrium path. A relatively small state space
may make the outlet non-influential or limit his signal possibilities. To ensure that this
is not the case, I assume that the state space is relatively large, i.e., φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 .
Intuitively, a larger state space implies more uncertainty over quality and thus a more
prominent role for an informed outlet. This assumption is sufficient to guarantee that
in equilibrium the outlet is influential and that candidates cannot gain from proposing
policies that make the outlet superfluous or that restrict the outlet’s signaling capacity.14
Strategies. A strategy for the incumbent is a binding commitment to a policy
proposal qi ∈ R; a strategy for the challenger is a function qc : R → R that assigns a
policy qc ∈ R to each incumbent’s proposal qi . I assume that candidates cannot condition
their proposals on the state or on the outlet’s reports.15 A reporting strategy for the
media outlet is a function ρ : Θ × R2 → R that associates a news report r ∈ R to every
tuple of proposals q ∈ R2 and quality θ ∈ Θ. I say that a report r is off-path if, given
strategy ρ(·), r will not be observed by the voter. Otherwise, I say that r is on-path. A
belief function for the voter is a mapping p : R × R2 → ∆(Θ) that, given any news report
r ∈ R and policies q ∈ R2 , generates posterior beliefs p(θ|r, q), where p(·) is a probability
density function. Given a report r and posterior beliefs p(θ|r, q), the voter casts a ballot
for a candidate in the sequentially rational set β(r, q) = arg maxb∈{i,c} Ep [uv (b, θ, q) | r].
Solution Concept. The solution concept is the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE),
refined by the Intuitive Criterion (Cho & Kreps, 1987).16 For most of the analysis, I
focus on the sender-preferred equilibrium defined as follows: when the voter is indifferent
between the two candidates at a given belief, she selects the one supported by the media
outlet; when a candidate is indifferent between some proposals, she advances the policy
closest to the outlet’s bliss ϕm . Given the potential conflict of interest between the voter
and the media outlet, the sender-preferred equilibrium is also the least preferred by the
voter. The focus on this type of equilibrium provides a useful benchmark consisting of
the voter’s worst-case scenario, which is key for the robust-control approach to policy
analysis (Hansen & Sargent, 2008). Moreover, it selects the unique perfect sequential
equilibrium (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986) of the communication subgame. I hereafter refer
to a sender-preferred PBE robust to the Intuitive Criterion simply as “equilibrium.”

cost function kC(r, θ) and prior f .
14
See Corollary A.1 in Appendix A.2.2.
15
This assumption is in line with the idea that all uncertainty about quality is publicly resolved only
after policy implementation, and policies cannot be easily changed in the short run. Moreover, candidates
cannot credibly and profitably condition their proposals on the media outlet’s reports.
16
For a textbook definition of PBE and Intuitive Criterion, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). A formal
definition of Intuitive Criterion is also provided in Appendix A.1
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3.1

Discussion of Assumptions

This section discusses the assumptions on the payoff and information structure of the
model. Section 6 further looks at several variations of the baseline model as robustness
checks, showing that most qualitative findings are robust to the model’s specifications.
Media’s Payoff. Unlike the voter, the outlet’s utility depends on whether his preferred
candidate m̂(θ, q) is elected, but not on the implemented policy qb . This assumption
allows to model a media outlet that has ideological preferences even when the candidates’
policies do not directly affect the outlet’s payoff. This is often the case, for example,
when editors, owners, and journalists have political leanings on issues such as abortion or
gay marriage that have no direct impact on the media organization itself. The score ξ
represents the outlet’s benefits from supporting the victorious rather than the defeated
candidate.17 In Section 6, I show that most qualitative results hold when the media’s
payoff is analogous as the voter’s.
Information Structure. The distributional assumption on θ implies that, during
the policy-making stage, both the candidates and the voter have uninformative priors
about the candidates’ relative quality. Information about θ is revealed to the media outlet
only after the policy-making stage. There are two main interpretation of this information
structure. First, it is political parties that commit to policies and then nominate their own
candidates. The parties cannot acquire every piece of information about the nominees’
quality, which is often hidden on purpose. Therefore, candidates may have information
about their own quality that parties cannot signal through the positions they take. Second,
information about the candidates’ quality is publicly known, but it is not sure how their
traits will advantage them in the future. In this case, θ represents the state of the world
in which the winning candidate will have to operate. For more discussion about this type
of information structure, see Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016).
Other Assumptions. Section 6 extends the baseline model to cases where there
are multiple informed media outlets, the media has preferences similar to the voter’s,
withholding information is possible, and policies are proposed simultaneously. There, I
also discuss the suitability of the equilibrium concept in use.

4

Equilibrium

I present the main equilibrium analysis in two parts: in Section 4.1, I begin by solving
for the equilibrium of the final communication subgame where, given any fixed pair
17

Alternatively, ξ may indicate the avoided losses that the outlet would expect to incur when opposing
the winning candidate. For example, after the publication of the first stories about the Watergate scandal,
President Nixon allegedly said “The Post is going to have damnable, damnable problems out of this
one. They have a television station. . . . and they’re going to have to get it renewed.” See references in
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008, p. 136).
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the outlet prefers c

the outlet prefers i

conflict of interest

θ
τv (q)
the voter prefers c

τm (q)
the voter prefers i

Figure 2: The media outlet and the voter’s favorite candidate for different levels of quality. The
states in which there is a conflict of interest are highlighted in gray.

of policies, the media outlet delivers to the voter a news report about the candidates’
quality. In Section 4.2 I proceed by studying the equilibrium of the policy-making stage,
where candidates sequentially commit to policy proposals. Formal proofs are relegated to
Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2.

4.1

The Communication Subgame

The communication subgame takes place after both candidates commit to policy proposals.
The media outlet privately observes the candidates’ relative quality θ and then delivers a
news report r consisting of a literal statement about θ. The voter, after observing the
outlet’s report but not the candidates’ quality, casts a ballot for either the incumbent or
the challenger. For convenience, I denote the communication subgame by Γ̂.
Given proposals q, the media outlet has a conflict of interest with the voter when
quality is between the thresholds τj (q), j ∈ {m, v}. Consider for example the case where
policies q are such that18 τm (q) > τv (q). When θ > τm (q) (resp. θ < τv (q)), the voter and
the outlet both agree that the best candidate is the incumbent (resp. the challenger). By
contrast, when θ ∈ (τv (q), τm (q)) the voter prefers the incumbent while the outlet prefers
the challenger. Since the voter cannot observe the realized quality, she is uncertain about
whether a conflict of interest exists or not. Figure 2 illustrates the preferred candidate of
the media outlet and the voter across different states and for the case τm (q) > τv (q).
The media outlet can misreport its private information about quality so as to induce
the election of its preferred candidate m̂(q, θ) and seize the gains ξ. Denote by Θ̂(q) the
set of states that lie strictly between the thresholds τj (q), j ∈ {m, v}. If the media outlet
delivers a report that induces the election of its preferred candidate when there is a conflict
of interest, then I say that persuasion has occurred.

18

We have that τm (q) > τv (q) when qc < qi , τm (q) < τv (q) when qc > qi , and τm (q) = τv (q) when
qc = qi . In the latter case, there is no conflict of interest between the media outlet and the voter.

13
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

15

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1394 [2022]

Definition 1 (Persuasion). The media outlet persuades the voter if β(ρ(θ, q), q) = m̂(θ, q)
for some θ ∈ Θ̂(q) = (min {τv (q), τm (q)} , max {τv (q), τm (q)}).
Since misreporting is costly, there is a limit to the reports that the outlet can profitably
deliver in a certain state. Therefore, differently than in cheap talk games, reports’
informational content is not arbitrarily determined by the voter’s strategic inference.
Consider a news report, r > τm (q), indicating that quality is sufficiently high for the
outlet to support the incumbent. Suppose now that r leads to the electoral victory of the
outlet’s supported candidate, β(r, q) = i. I define the “lowest misreporting type” l(r) as
the highest state19 θ in which the outlet does not find it strictly profitable to deliver the
news report r. More formally, for some report r > τm (q) such that β(r, q) = i,
o
n
p
l(r) = max r − ξ/k, τm (q) .
In equilibrium, the voter understands that such a report r could not be profitably
delivered if quality is lower than l(r), and should accordingly place probability zero on
every θ < l(r). I similarly define the “highest misreporting type” h(r) as the lowest state
in which the outlet does not find it strictly profitable to deliver a news report r < τm (q)
such that β(r, q) = c. Formally,
n
o
p
h(r) = min r + ξ/k, τm (q) .
I can now present the main result of this section: in the equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂, the media outlet “jams” information by delivering the same pooling
report r∗ (q) whenever quality takes values around the voter’s threshold τv (q). Otherwise,
when quality is relatively far from τv (q), the outlet always reports truthfully. When
observing the pooling report r∗ (q), the voter ’s expectation about quality is exactly τv (q),
and therefore she is indifferent between the two candidates.20 This result helps us to find
the candidates’ equilibrium probability of electoral victory given any pair of proposals q.
Lemma 1. The equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂ is a pair (ρ(θ, q), p(θ|r, q))
such that, given policy proposals21 q,
i) If τv (q) < τm (q), then

ρ(θ, q) =




q

r∗ (q) = max τv (q) − 1 ξ , 2τv (q) − τm (q)
2
k

if θ ∈ (r∗ (q), h(r∗ (q)))


θ

otherwise.

19

In the jargon commonly used in signaling games, the state is also referred to as the “type” of sender.
In the sender-preferred equilibrium, the voter selects the candidate preferred by the media outlet
when indifferent. Therefore, the voter never mixes.
21
Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ, q) due to the media outlet being indifferent between reporting
∗
l(r (q)) and r∗ (q) (resp. h(r∗ (q)) and r∗ (q)) when the state is θ = l(r∗ (q)) > τm (q) and τm (q) < τv (q)
(resp. θ = h(r∗ (q)) < τm (q) and τm (q) > τv (q)).
20
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ii) If τv (q) > τm (q), then

ρ(θ, q) =




q

ξ
1
∗
r (q) = min τv (q) +
, 2τv (q) − τm (q)
2
k

if θ ∈ (l (r∗ (q)) , r∗ (q))


θ

otherwise.

iii) If τv (q) = τm (q), then ρ(θ, q) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ.
iv) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r, q) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep [θ |r∗ (q)] = τv (q); for every off-path r, Ep [θ |r] < τv (q) when τv (q) > τm (q),
and Ep [θ |r] > τv (q) when τv (q) < τm (q); otherwise, p(θ|r, q) are degenerate at θ = r.
To understand the intuition behind Lemma 1, consider the case where proposals q are
such that τv (q) < τm (q), and suppose that there exists a fully revealing equilibrium in
truthful strategies, where ρ(θ, q) = θ for every θ ∈ Θ. When quality is slightly higher
than the voter’s threshold τv (q), the media outlet can deliver some report r ≤ τv (q) such
that the incurred misreporting costs are lower than the gains obtained from supporting
the winning candidate, i.e., k(r − θ)2 < ξ. Given the truthful reporting rule ρ(θ, q), the
voter takes the outlet’s reports at face value, and thus casts a ballot for the challenger
after observing any r ≤ τv (q). The outlet has a strictly profitable deviation, implying that
in equilibrium there must be misreporting in some state.
Misreporting is a costly activity, and therefore the media outlet misreports only if
doing so induces the electoral victory of its preferred candidate m̂(θ, q). Moreover, if it is
profitable for the outlet to deliver a report r0 < τm (q) when quality is θ0 ∈ (r0 , τm (q)), then
reporting r0 must be profitable for all θ ∈ [r0 , θ0 ]. This suggests that in equilibrium the
outlet “pools” information about quality by delivering the same report r∗ (q) for different
states in a convex set S(r∗ (q)) such that m̂(θ0 , q) = m̂(θ00 , q) for all θ0 , θ00 ∈ S(r∗ (q)).
Upon observing the pooling report r∗ (q), the voter infers that the realized quality is
in the set S(r∗ (q)). If the voter’s expectation about quality Ep [θ|r∗ (q)] is greater than
her threshold τv (q), then she casts a ballot for the incumbent; otherwise she votes for the
challenger. Therefore, by pooling states around τv (q) in a way such that Ep [θ|r∗ (q)] ≤ τv (q),
the outlet can induce the election of the challenger even when quality is such that the
voter’s preferred candidate is the incumbent. That is, the outlet can achieve persuasion
by pooling information about quality.
The candidate supported by the media outlet is more likely to be elected when the
pooling report r∗ (q) makes the voter just indifferent between casting a ballot for the
incumbent and the challenger: pooling reports that induce lower expectations have the
same effect on the voter’s choice but are more expensive to deliver when there is a conflict
of interest. Therefore, in equilibrium the outlet misreports by delivering a pooling report
r∗ (q) that jams states around the voter’s threshold in a way such that Ep [θ|r∗ (q)] = τv (q).
15
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This kind of pooling strategy prescribes the outlet to misreport even in states where
there is no conflict of interest. Even though at first it might seem counterintuitive, this
reporting behavior is consistent with strategic skepticism: the voter, being aware of the
media outlet’s leaning and misreporting technology, demands sufficiently strong evidence
that quality is low enough for the challenger to be elected. Therefore, when quality is
just slightly below τv (q), the outlet must nevertheless misreport to overcome the voter’s
skepticism.
By contrast, truthful reporting always occurs when quality takes extreme values that
are relatively far from the voter’s threshold τv (q). There are two possibilities in this
case: either there is a conflict of interest, or the interests of the outlet and the voter are
aligned. In the former case, misreporting is not convenient for the outlet as it would be
prohibitively costly to deliver a report that induces the election of its preferred candidate.
In the latter case, the outlet does not need to misreport because the true realization of
quality is a sufficiently discriminating signal for the voter be trustful.
Lemma 1 shows that, given proposals q, the media outlet persuades the voter when
θ ∈ (τv (q), h(r∗ (q))) if τv (q) < τm (q) and when θ ∈ (l(r∗ (q)), τv (q)) if τv (q) > τm (q). If
τv (q) = τm (q), then there cannot be persuasion since the outlet and the voter always agree
on which candidate is best. By contrast, I say that the outlet exerts “full persuasion” if
persuasion occurs in every state in which there is a conflict of interest.
Definition 2 (Full persuasion). The media outlet exerts full persuasion if β(ρ(θ, q), q) =
m̂(θ, q) for all θ ∈ Θ̂(q).
The media outlet has fully persuasive power if, given policy proposals q, the misreporting costs k are low enough to make persuasion affordable inevery state
where there
i
is a conflict of interest. Formally, there is full persuasion if k ∈ 0, k̂(q) , where22
k̂(q) =

ξ
.
4γ 2 (τv (q) − τm (q))2

Alternatively, the outlet exerts full persuasion if, given misreporting costs k, the proposals
qi and qc are sufficiently close to each other. Intuitively, as candidates’ policies become
more similar, the preferences of the voter and the outlet become more aligned, and the set
of states in which there is a conflict of interest becomes smaller. Since the outlet’s potential
gains ξ are fixed, the share of states in which persuasion occurs under a conflict of interest
increases as proposals get closer. If policies are sufficiently similar, then persuasion occurs
every time there is a conflict of interest. Formally, there is full persuasion when proposals
q are such that
ξ
(qc − qi )2 ≤
.
(1)
16γ 2 (ϕm − ϕv )2 k
The cost threshold k̂(q) is obtained by setting h(r∗ (q)) = τm (q) for τv (q) < τm (q) or l(r∗ (q)) = τm (q)
for τv (q) > τm (q), where r∗ (q) is defined as in Lemma 1.
22
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Figure 3 shows the equilibrium reporting rule of Lemma 1 for different policies and
misreporting costs. In panel (a), the outlet is more likely than the voter to prefer the
challenger and misreporting costs are relatively high. In this case, the media outlet
discredits the incumbent by delivering a report that “belittles” realizations of quality
around the voter’s threshold τv (q). With this strategy, the outlet achieves persuasion
in those states that are highlighted in light gray. By contrast, truthful reporting occurs
despite a conflict of interest in states that are highlighted in dark gray: in these cases,
persuasion is prohibitively expensive because of the relatively high misreporting costs
k > k̂(q). In states that are highlighted in gray, the outlet spends resources to misreport
information even though no conflict of interest is in place. These “white lies” are the
result of the voter’s skepticism about news reports that are not sufficiently discriminatory.
Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows the equilibrium reporting rule when the outlet is more
likely than the voter to prefer the incumbent and misreporting costs are relatively low. In
this case, the media outlet supports the incumbent by delivering reports that “exaggerate”
realizations of quality23 around the voter’s threshold τv (q). Low misreporting costs allow
the outlet to exert full persuasion and induce the election of its preferred candidate every
time there is a conflict of interest. As before, states in which the outlet delivers white lies
are highlighted in gray, while states in which the outlet persuades the voter are in light
gray.

4.2

The Policy-making Stage

Consider now the policy-making stage, where candidates sequentially make a binding
commitment to a policy proposal. Since candidates are purely office-seeking, they advance
policies to maximize their chances of getting elected. The result in the previous section is
key for finding the candidates’ equilibrium proposals: Lemma 1 shows the media outlet’s
equilibrium reporting rule and thus pins down the candidates’ probability of electoral
victory given any pair of policies q.
I denote by qi∗ (k) the equilibrium policy advanced by the incumbent and by qc∗ (qi , k)
the challenger’s best response to some proposal qi . I refer to policies that are relatively
close to the voter’s bliss ϕv as “populist” and to policies that are relatively close to
the outlet’s bliss ϕm as “biased.” The next result establishes the equilibrium proposals
q ∗ (k) = (qi∗ (k), qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k)) as a function of the misreporting costs’ intensity k.

23

There are perfect Bayesian equilibria in the communication subgame Γ̂ where the outlet supports the
incumbent (resp. challenger) by delivering a report that is lower (resp. higher) than the actual realization
of quality. These equilibria do not survive the Intuitive Criterion test.
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ρ(θ, q)

ρ(θ, q)

r∗ (q)
h(r∗ (q))

r∗ (q)

l(r∗ (q))
θ

θ
τv (q)

τm (q)

τm (q)

(a) τv (q) < τm (q) and k > k̂(q).

τv (q)

(b) τv (q) > τm (q) and 0 < k ≤ k̂(q).

Figure 3: The two panels illustrate the equilibrium reporting rule for different levels of misreporting costs and ordering of policy proposals. The states in which persuasion occurs are highlighted
in light gray. The states in which the outlet misreports even though there is no conflict of
interest are highlighted in gray. The states in which the outlet reveals the true realization of
quality even though there is a conflict of interest are highlighted in dark gray.

Proposition 1. The equilibrium policies q ∗ (k) are

qi∗ (k) =




ϕ +

 v

√

ξ/k
4γ(ϕv −ϕm )

√

ϕv +ϕm
 2





−

−

q
4

ξ
γ2k

ξ/k
4γ(ϕv −ϕm )


if k ∈ k̄/4, k̄

if k ∈ 0, k̄/4

ϕm

qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k)

=


q
ϕv − 4
ϕ

if k > k̄

ξ
γ2k

if k > k̄
if k ∈ 0, k̄

m

where the misreporting costs threshold is k̄ =



ξ
.
γ 2 (ϕv −ϕm )4

In equilibrium, proposals are weakly increasing in k and strictly increasing for every
ξ
finite24 k > k̄ = γ 2 (ϕv −ϕ
4 . When the costs of misreporting information are relatively low,
m)

i.e. for k ∈ 0, k̄/4 , both candidates advance the media outlet’s bliss policy ϕm . Thus,

variations of k within the region 0, k̄/4 leave the equilibrium policies unaltered. For

intermediate costs, k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ , the incumbent proposes increasingly moderate policies

m
qi∗ (k) ∈ ϕm , ϕv +ϕ
, while the challenger keeps offering the outlet’s bliss ϕm . Thus,
2

an increase of k in the region k̄/4, k̄ generates policy divergence. When the costs of
misreporting are relatively high, k > k̄, the challenger proposes less biased policies as well.
As k grows arbitrarily large, both proposals converge to the voter’s preferred policy ϕv ,
24

The threshold k̄ is the highest intensity of misreporting costs such that the challenger best responds
with ϕm when undercutting the incumbent’s proposal.
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q* ( k )

q*i ( k )
q*c ( q*i ( k ) , k )

φm

k/4

k

k

Figure 4: Equilibrium policy proposals for different intensities of misreporting costs. As k grows
arbitrarily large, both proposals monotonically converge to ϕv .

with qi∗ (k) > qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k) for every finite25 k > k̄/4. Figure 4 illustrates the equilibrium
policy proposals for different levels of misreporting costs’ intensity k.
Here I discuss the intuition behind Proposition 1. Since policies outside the set [ϕm , ϕv ]
are always dominated, I restrict attention26 to qj ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ], j ∈ {i, c}. First, consider the
challenger’s problem of best responding to the incumbent’s proposal. When the incumbent
proposes a relatively populist policy, the challenger’s best response is to “undercut” the
incumbent with the most biased policy qc < qi that endows the media outlet with fully
persuasive power.27 With this strategy, the challenger maximizes both the extent of the
conflict of interest (τm (q), τv (q)) and the probability of receiving the outlet’s support,
subject to the outlet exerting full persuasion. Even though the challenger’s best response
is less appealing to the voter, the loss in “popular appeal” is more than compensated by
the outlet’s ability to persuade the voter over a large set of contingencies. By contrast,
offering a more populist policy qc > qi would make the challenger slightly more appealing
to the voter at the expense of getting the incumbent into the good graces of a fully
persuasive media outlet. Thus, offering any qc > qi is suboptimal in this case.
When the incumbent proposes relatively biased policies and misreporting costs are
sufficiently high, the best response of the challenger is to offer the voter’s bliss ϕv . This
strategy generates a large conflict of interest Θ̂(q) = (τm (q), τv (q)) such that the voter
requires evidence that quality is exceptionally high in order to vote for the incumbent.
The outlet is now more likely to support the incumbent than the challenger but, because
Equilibrium proposals are continuous in k as limk→k̄+ qi∗ (k) = limk→k̄− qi∗ (k) and limk→k̄/4 qi∗ (k) =
limk→k̄/4 qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k) = ϕm .
26
The focus on policies in the set [ϕm , ϕv ] is without loss of generality: for both candidates j ∈ {i, c},
proposals qj > ϕv (resp. qj < ϕm ) are dominated by every qj0 ∈ [ϕv , qj ) (resp. qj0 ∈ (qj , ϕm ]) as any such
qj0 is more appealing to both the voter and the outlet.
27
Formally, the challenger offers the lowest proposal that satisfies condition (1) with equality.
25

19
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2022

21

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 1394 [2022]

qc∗ (qi , k)
ϕv

ϕm
qi
ϕm

ϕv

Figure 5: The challenger’s best response for different intensities of misreporting costs. The best
response is depicted
 in black for relatively high costs, k > k̄; in dashed light gray for intermediate
costs, k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ ; in dark gray, for relatively low costs, k ∈ 0, k̄/4 .

of high misreporting costs and a sharp policy divergence, it cannot exert full persuasion.
In this case, offering the voter’s bliss ϕv is the challenger’s best response because it leaves
the incumbent with an unpopular policy and the support of a weakened media outlet.
Similarly, when the incumbent’s policy is relatively biased but misreporting costs are
sufficiently low, the challenger’s best response remains that of undercutting the incumbent.
The strategy of proposing the voter’s bliss now backfires because with a low intensity
of misreporting costs the media outlet retains its ability to persuade the voter in a
relatively large share of Θ̂(q). If the costs’ intensity k is low enough, then the challenger’s
best response is to undercut the proposal of the incumbent to the point of offering the
outlet’s bliss ϕm . Figure 5 shows the challenger’s best response for different intensities of
misreporting costs.28
Consider now the incumbent’s problem of selecting a policy that maximizes her
probability of electoral victory, and suppose first that the intensity of misreporting costs
is relatively high, k > k̄/4. In this case, the optimal proposal of the incumbent qi∗ (k) is
the policy that makes the challenger indifferent whether to best reply with the voter’s
bliss or with a relatively more biased policy (i.e., by undercutting the incumbent): higher
proposals qi > qi∗ (k) would allow the challenger to get the support of a fully persuasive
outlet; lower proposals qi < qi∗ (k) would be highly unpopular in comparison with the
challenger’s best response of offering the voter’s bliss. By contrast, when the intensity of

misreporting costs is relatively low, k ∈ 0, k̄/4 , the media outlet exerts full persuasion
for any combination of candidates’ proposals q ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ]2 . In this case, the incumbent’s
optimal policy is to offer the outlet’s bliss, as any higher proposal qi > ϕm would allow
the challenger to get the support of a fully persuasive media outlet by undercutting29 qi .
28
29

Proposition A.2 in Appendix A.2.1 shows the challenger’s best response function.
Notice that the model does not predict that the incumbent always takes a more populist position
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The presence of a persuasive media outlet generates a distortion in the process of
policy-making. Since candidates look to gain both the consensus of the voter and the
support of the influential outlet, their proposals drift away from the voter’s preferred policy,
breaking down the centripetal force of the median voter theorem (Black, 1948; Downs,
1957). This distortion peaks when the intensity of misreporting costs is sufficiently low so
that both candidates advance the media outlet’s bliss policy. In this case, persuasion never
takes place since there is no conflict of interest when candidates’ proposals are identical
(see Lemma 1). Therefore, with lower (resp. higher) intensities of misreporting costs the
voter might have worse (resp. better) policies but more (resp. less) information about
quality. In the next section, I study this trade-off in relation to the voter’s welfare.

5

Welfare and Regulation

Having characterized the equilibrium of the communication subgame (Lemma 1 in Section 4.1) and the candidates’ equilibrium proposals (Proposition 1 in Section 4.2), I now
proceed to study their welfare implications. I denote by Wv∗ (k) the voter’s equilibrium
expected utility and refer to Wv∗ (k) simply as the voter’s welfare.30 As a benchmark,
consider the voter’s expected utility under complete information, which I denote by Ŵv .
Suppose that the voter perfectly observes the realized quality after the policy-making
stage but before the election takes place. In this case, both candidates cannot do better
than offer the voter’s bliss policy as the media outlet would have no role. The candidate
with the highest relative quality is always elected and the voter’s favorite policy is always
implemented. Therefore, Ŵv = φ/4.
In Section 5.1, I study how the intensity of misreporting costs affects different determinants of the voter’s welfare. In Section 5.2, I extend the main model by allowing
candidates to select the costs’ intensity ahead of the policy-making stage. Formal proofs
are relegated to Appendix A.3.

5.1

The Voter’s Welfare

Consider the problem of a regulator that seeks to maximize the welfare of the voter by
selecting the intensity of misreporting costs. This type of intervention can be performed, for
example, by issuing “fake news laws” or by subsidizing watchdogs that expose to the public
those media outlets that concoct news reports. As we have seen in the previous section,
the process of policy-making is strategically intertwined with the voter’s informational
environment. Interventions that change the misreporting costs might affect both the
than to the challenger. While this happens in the sender-preferred equilibrium, there are other equilibria
where the challenger goes fully populist by offering the voter’s favorite policy and the incumbent proposes
a relatively more biased policy. See Proposition A.2.
30
See equation (4) in Appendix A.3 for an explicit formulation of Wv∗ (k).
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amount of information received by the voter and the policies advanced by the candidates.31
To maximize the voter’s welfare, it is crucial for regulators to understand the consequences
and the trade-offs involved in these types of interventions.
Before showing the next result, it is thus useful to note some important features of
the equilibria in Proposition 1 and Lemma 1. First, equilibrium policies q ∗ (k) satisfy
condition (1) for every finite k: on the equilibrium path, the media outlet always exerts
full persuasion and the candidate preferred by the outlet, m̂(q ∗ (k), θ), is always elected.
Figure 6 shows the outlet’s reporting rule on the equilibrium path for some finite k > k̄/4.
Second, an increase in the misreporting costs’ intensity does not necessarily yield more
information to the voter. Intuitively, since the outlet exerts full persuasion, the larger
the conflict of interest Θ̂(q ∗ (k)), the less the information received by the voter. Recall
that the share of states in which there is a conflict of interest is directly proportional
to the difference between proposals.32 It follows that an increase in k yields more (resp.
less) information to the voter only if it generates policy convergence (resp. divergence).
However, Proposition 1 shows that the distance between equilibrium proposals is nonmonotonic33 in k. Hence, an increase in the misreporting costs’ intensity might decrease
the amount of information received by the voter in equilibrium. Third, with a relatively

low intensity of misreporting costs, k ∈ 0, k̄/4 , there is no conflict of interest because
equilibrium policies are identical. In this case, persuasion never occurs and the media
outlet fully reveals its private information about quality. By contrast, persuasion always
takes place with positive probability for every finite k > k̄/4. Therefore, in equilibrium
there is persuasion only if the misreporting costs’ intensity is sufficiently high.
Since an increase in the misreporting costs might yield the voter better policies at the
expense of selecting the best candidate with lower probability, it is not clear how this
type of intervention would affect the voter’s welfare. The next proposition clears up this
ambiguity by showing that increments in the costs’ intensity k never harm the voter.
Proposition 2. The voter’s equilibrium welfare Wv∗ (k) is independent of k for all k ∈

0, k̄/4 , and strictly increasing in k for all finite k ≥ k̄/4. As k → ∞, Wv∗ (k) → Ŵv .
Proposition 2 shows that even in those cases where an increase in k generates more
persuasion, the gain that the voter obtains from having better policies always overcomes
the expected loss in quality due to worse selection. Denote by χ(k) the ex-ante probability
that persuasion occurs, called the “persuasion rate.” From Proposition 1 and Lemma 1,
∗
∗
v (q (k))
we have that on the equilibrium path the persuasion rate is χ(k) = τm (q (k))−τ
. As
2φ
observed before, the media outlet is more likely to persuade the voter when the set of
31

The voter receives more (resp. less) information if, given the outlet’s reporting rule ρ(·), she casts a
ballot for her preferred candidate in more (resp. less) states.
32
Formally, |Θ̂ (q ∗ (k)) | = 2γ(ϕv − ϕm ) (qi∗ (k) − qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k)).
33
A marginal
increment in k generates policy convergencefor all finite k > k̄, policy divergence for all

k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ , and has no effect on policies for all k ∈ 0, k̄/4 .
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ρ(θ, q)
h(r∗ (q ∗ (k)))

r∗ (q ∗ (k))
θ
τv

(q ∗ (k))

τm

(q ∗ (k))

Figure 6: The media outlet’s reporting rule on the equilibrium path for some finite costs’ intensity
k > k̄/4. The outlet exerts full persuasion and its preferred candidate is always elected.

states in which there is a conflict of interest Θ̂(q ∗ (k)) is larger. Figure 7 shows both the
voter’s welfare and the probability that persuasion occurs as a function of k.


The policy/information trade-off occurs when k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ : in this case, a marginal
increase in the costs’ intensity k generates policy divergence, more disagreement, and
thus a higher persuasion rate χ(k). As a consequence, the voter becomes increasingly
likely to cast a ballot for the wrong candidate. The expected loss in quality due to worse
selection is more than compensated by the availability of an increasingly populist policy
advanced by the incumbent: since the proposals of both candidates are heavily skewed
toward the media outlet’s preferred policy, the voter obtains an exceptionally high gain
from policies that, on average, are closer to her bliss. When k ≥ k̄, an increase in the
costs’ intensity generates proposals that are both more populist and closer to each other.
The resulting policy convergence reduces the conflict of interest, and thus the persuasion
rate χ(k) declines. In this case, the welfare of the voter increases because she obtains

better policies and makes a better selection of candidates. By contrast, when k ∈ 0, k̄/4 ,
a marginal increase in the costs’ intensity has no effect on equilibrium policies and thus
does not impact the voter’s welfare either. As a result, lenient measures can actually
decrease the voter’s welfare when taking into consideration the public resources required
to carry out the interventions.
The media outlet provides the voter with useful information about candidates’ quality,
but on the other hand it generates a policy distortion where proposals drift away from the
voter’s bliss. This trade-off reaches its peak when the intensity of misreporting costs is
relatively low: the media outlet fully reveals its private information about quality but the
proposals of both candidates collapse to the outlet’s preferred policy. If the quality of the
elected candidate is of little importance with respect to the implemented policy, then the
voter might be better off without the media outlet: in this case, both candidates would
23
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χ(k)

Wv * ( k )

0
k/4

k

(a) The voter’s equilibrium welfare.

k

k/4

k

k

(b) The probability of persuasion in equilibrium.

Figure 7: The voter’s welfare increases with the intensity of misreporting costs even when higher
costs’ intensities leads to a higher persuasion rate. With relatively low intensities of misreporting
costs there is no persuasion but the voter’s welfare is at its minimum. As k grows arbitrarily
large, Wv∗ (k) and χ(k) converge monotonically to Ŵv = φ/4 and zero, respectively.

pander to the uninformed voter by offering her preferred policy, and the voter would
randomly cast a ballot for one of the two candidates. The next result shows conditions
under which the voter is better off without the media outlet.
Corollary 1. If −γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 + φ/4 < 0, then there exists a finite k 0 > k̄/4 such that
the voter is strictly better off without media outlet for all k ∈ (0, k 0 ).
Alternatively, the voter might be better off with a “pre-election silence” period that
forbids the delivery of policy-relevant news in the run-up to the election.34 Conditional
on the intensity of misreporting costs being low enough, the voter is better off without
the media outlet if: (i) γ is high enough, so that policies are much more important than
quality; (ii) the preferred policy of the voter and the media outlet are different enough;
i.e., there is a large ideological difference |ϕv − ϕm |; (iii) φ is small enough; that is, quality
has little impact on which candidate is best. By contrast, if the costs’ intensity is high
enough, then the presence of the media outlet always benefits the voter. Corollary 1 is
complementary to the similar findings of Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) in a cheap talk
setting, Alonso and Camara (2016) in a Bayesian persuasion framework, and Boleslavsky
and Cotton (2015) for a non-strategic and exogenous media outlet.

5.2

Endogenous Regulation

In the previous section, Proposition 2 suggests that a regulator concerned about the
voter’s welfare should implement an intensity of misreporting costs that is as high as
possible. However, regulation is often performed by actors that are neither fully detached
from the political process nor have interests that are perfectly aligned with those of voters.
34

Several countries operate an “election silence” period where no campaigning, polling, or endorsement
of candidates is allowed in the period preceding a general or presidential election.
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In fact, “fake news laws” are mostly promulgated and discussed in parliaments where the
incumbent government has substantial decisive and legislative power.35 I first discuss the
case where the incumbent candidate selects the intensity of misreporting costs.
Consider the following extension of the main model: ahead of the policy-making stage,
the incumbent sets costs’ intensity ki > 0, which is publicly observed and cannot be
changed in the short run. Then, the game proceeds as described in Section 3. The
incumbent, being purely office-seeking, selects ki to maximize her chances of electoral
victory. From the previous analysis, we obtain that in equilibrium the incumbent wins
(q ∗ (k))
the election with probability ι(k) = φ−τm2φ
. I denote by ki∗ the costs’ intensity that
maximizes ι(k). The next result shows that the incumbent candidate would select a costs’
intensity that is relatively low.
Lemma 2. The incumbent sets costs’ intensity ki∗ ∈
limk→∞ ι(k).


0, k̄/4 , where ι (ki∗ ) =

1
2

=

To see the intuition behind this result, recall that the sequential nature of the policymaking process allows the challenger to offer policies that are more appealing to the
media outlet relative to those offered by the incumbent (Proposition 1). By obtaining the
outlet’s support, the challenger enjoys a second-mover advantage as she becomes more
likely to be elected than the incumbent.36 Figure 8 shows that the incumbent’s probability
of electoral victory is less than a half for all finite k > k̄/4. Lemma 2 shows that, when in
charge of regulation, the incumbent eliminates the challenger’s second-mover advantage
by setting relatively low misreporting costs to force policy-convergence: when candidates
advance the same policy, the media outlet never engages in misreporting, and thus the
challenger cannot benefit from the outlet’s support. Any higher intensity of misreporting
costs would generate policy divergence and thus a conflict of interest that would benefit
the challenger at the expense of the incumbent’s probability of electoral victory.
Lemma 2 casts a negative light on the process of regulation. From the voter’s
viewpoint, the incumbent could not select a worse costs’ intensity: even though ki∗ is
such that misreporting and persuasion never take place, the induced policy distortion
is maximized and the voter’s welfare is at its minimum. The resulting outcome is as
if the media outlet could directly decide upon which candidate gets elected and which
policy is implemented. Moreover, for such a low intensity of misreporting costs ki∗ the
voter might be better off without the media outlet at all (Corollary 1). The situation
is better, but still far from ideal, when the challenger is in charge of selecting the costs’
intensity: in this case, the challenger maximizes her chances of electoral victory by selecting
35

Funke and Famini (2018) provide a comprehensive list of measures recently taken by governments
against online misinformation.
36
The incumbency disadvantage effect that is behind the result in Lemma 2 is present also in equilibria
that are non-sender-preferred. By definition, ι(k) is the same even when the challenger does not break
indifference in favor of the media outlet.
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Figure 8: The incumbent’s probability of electoral victory, ι(k), as a function of the costs’
intensity k. As the intensity of misreporting costs grows arbitrarily large, ι(k) monotonically
converges to 1/2.

kc∗ = arg mink∈R+ ι(k) > k̄. This level of costs’ intensity generates policy divergence and
thus a positive persuasion rate χ(k). However, the voter is better off with kc∗ than with ki∗
because of a reduction in policy distortion. As long as candidates have an influence over
the regulatory process, their office-seeking motivation results in a pull for implementing
costs’ intensities that are lower than the voter’s optimal.

6

Discussion and Extensions

6.1

Extensions

This section considers several extensions of the baseline model to examine the robustness
of the results. Formal proofs are relegated to the Supplementary Appendix B.
Multiple Media Outlets. A monopoly best describes those cases where media
outlets can have exclusive possession of policy-relevant news. Therefore, the analysis
of a monopolistic news market is an important and natural first step to understand
interventions that affect misreporting costs. As follows, I show that all results obtained
in the baseline model carry through even when there is more than one informed media
outlet.
Consider a variant of the baseline model where there are n > 1 informed media outlets in
the set M = {1, 2, . . . , n}. A report by outlet j is rj . Each j ∈ M has a bliss policy ϕj < ϕv .
Therefore, senders are “like biased.”37 The preferred candidate of outlet j is m̂j (θ, q) = i
37

Even though the media outlets are all biased in the same direction with respect to the voter, there
are states in which they may prefer different candidates. In these cases, the outlets compete against each
other. I study the case where outlets have “opposed biases” in Vaccari (2021).

26
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1394

28

Vaccari: Influential News and Policy-making

if θ > τj (q) and m̂j (θ, q) = c otherwise, where τj (q) = γ(2ϕj − qc − qi )(qc − qi ). Outlet j
obtains a payoff of uj (rj , b, θ, q) = 1{b = m̂j (θ, q)}ξj −k(rj −θ)2 when reporting rj in state θ.
I denote the profile of reports by {rj }M , and the voter’s posterior
beliefs by pM (θ|{r
n
o j }M , q).
p
The “highest misreporting type” of outlet j is hj (rj ) = min rj + ξj /k, τj (q) . I denote
with Γ̂M the communication subgame of this multi-sender variant of the baseline model.
The rest of the model remains as before.
I define the “least biased” media outlet as the outlet that, by himself, would achieve
persuasion less often. Specifically, the least biased outlet
` ∈ M has |r`∗ (q) − τv (q)|o ≤
n
p
|rj∗ (q) − τv (q)| for every j ∈ M , where ri∗ (q) = max τv (q) − 12 ξi /k, 2τv (q) − τi (q) if
n
o
p
1
∗
τv (q) < τi (q), and ri (q) = min τv (q) + 2 ξi /k, 2τv (q) − τi (q) if τv (q) > τi (q).
There exists an equilibrium of Γ̂M where all media outlets report in the same way as
the least biased outlet would do in a monopolistic news market.
Corollary 2. Suppose that τv (q) < τj (q) for all j ∈ M . Then, there exists an equilibrium
of the communication subgame Γ̂M where, for every j ∈ M ,

ρj (θ, q) =




q

ξ
1
∗
`
r (q) = max τv (q) −
, 2τv (q) − τ` (q)
`
2
k

if θ ∈ (r`∗ (q), h` (r`∗ (q)))


θ

otherwise.

Posterior beliefs pM (θ|{rj }M , q) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that EpM [θ|{r`∗ (q)}M ] = τv (q), EpM [θ|{rj }M ] > τv (q) if ri > r`∗ (q) for some i ∈ M , and
EpM [θ|{rj }M ] ≤ τv (q) if rj ≤ r`∗ (q) for all j ∈ M .
In this equilibrium, all media outlets belittle the realized quality in the same way. The
media’s reporting strategy is pinned down by the characteristics of least biased outlet `.
More biased outlets may want to misreport in more states, but they cannot profitably do
so because the voter can always cross-validate their reports with that of the least biased
outlet `. This result suggests that an outlet with exclusive possession of an influential
scoop is willing to share such information only with like-biased outlets that are relatively
“more biased.” Therefore, the case considered here, where all outlets are biased in the
same direction with respect to the voter, is of particular relevance.38
Since the least biased outlet is key for persuasion, the candidates will seek for his
support when proposing their polices. Importantly, they would never propose policies that
are lower than `’s bliss ϕ` , for doing so would make them lose the support of both the
voter and the least biased outlet at the same time. This justifies the focus of Corollary 2
38

Corollary 2 shows that equilibrium communication is essentially driven by the least biased outlet. In
a cheap talk model, Krishna and Morgan (2001) find a similar result. There are other equilibria with
multiple outlets. Notably, there are fully revealing equilibria in truthful strategies where ρj (θ, q) = θ
for every θ ∈ Θ, q ∈ R2 , and j ∈ M . These equilibria are not robust to outlets’ collusion, that is, to
non-binding pre-play communication. For a formal proof, see Vaccari (2021).
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on the case where τv (q) < τj (q) for all j ∈ M . It follows that all the results obtained from
the baseline model with a single media outlet extend to this multi-sender variant.
The Media as a Voter. In the baseline model, the media outlet obtains fixed
policy-independent gains ξ > 0 when the candidate he prefers wins the election. As
argued in Section 3, this is an adequate approach to model an ideologically biased media
organization (because, e.g., of the ownership or editor) but that is not directly affected by
the candidates’ policies (such as, e.g., abortion laws or gay marriage). Moreover, we have
seen in the previous sections that this payoff configuration allows us to obtain closed-form
solutions. However, some policies may affect the media outlet in an analogous way as
they affect voters. Therefore, it is crucial to understand whether results are robust to
this alternative payoff configuration. To this end, I consider a variant of the baseline
model where the media outlet’s payoff is similar to that of the voter. In this extension,
the outlet’s gains from inducing the election of her favourite candidate depend on the
candidates’ policies q and the outlet’s bliss ϕm . As follows, I provide a brief summary of
the results obtained in this case.39 For a formal analysis and discussion, see Appendix B.2.
The outlet’s gains from persuasion now depend on the policies q and the realized state
θ. Since the voter uses strategic inference to learn the state from the outlet’s reports, the
analysis of the communication subgame is similar to that performed in the baseline model.
Furthermore, even candidates’ incentives remain similar. In particular, the challenger can
still garner a second-mover advantage by catering to the media outlet with a relatively
more distorted policy. As in the main analysis, policy divergence occurs for intermediate
levels of misreporting costs, whereas convergence occurs at the limit as k → +∞ and
k → 0+ . Therefore, the qualitative results concerning policy distortion and the persuasion
rate follow through even when the outlet’s gains are policy-dependent. In addition, higher
misreporting costs can still generate more misreporting and persuasion, and yet make the
voter better off. As a result, the qualitative results about the link between misreporting
costs, persuasion, and the voter’s welfare hold in this variant of the main model.
Simultaneous Policy-making. In the main model, I assume that candidates propose
policies sequentially. The sequential nature of the policy-making process is important
as it shows that the challenger enjoys a second-mover advantage. As a result, the
incumbent can use regulation to eliminate the challenger’s advantage at the expense of the
voter. However, most qualitative results hold even when candidates propose their policies
simultaneously. In Lemma B.3, I show that in this case policy convergence to (ϕm , ϕm )
occurs when k ≤ k̄/4, exactly as in the case where policy-making is sequential. Moreover,
for intermediate values of k the equilibrium of the policy-making stage must be in mixed
strategies (see Lemma B.4). This implies that for intermediate k policy divergence occurs

39

In Appendix B.2, I also consider the special case where the media outlet’s payoff depends solely on
the candidates’ policies but not on the state.
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with positive probability.40 Finally, for k → +∞ we still obtain convergence to (ϕv , ϕv ).
Therefore, the main qualitative results about policy distortions and the rate of persuasion
hold even when candidates propose their policies simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Equilibrium Selection. Conditions that ensure equilibrium uniqueness are important
to perform exercises of comparative statics. However, as it is typical in communication
games, here there are multiple equilibria. In this paper, I mainly focus on the perfect
Bayesian equilibrium that is robust to the Intuitive Criterion and preferred by the
sender. There are several reasons why this is a sensible choice: first, the sender-preferred
equilibrium constitutes also the voter’s worse case scenario, which is key for the robust
approach to policy analysis (Hansen & Sargent, 2008); second, it is also the unique perfect
sequential equilibrium (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986); third, among the perfect Bayesian
equilibria that survive the Intuitive Criterion, the sender-preferred is the only one that is
undefeated (Mailath, Okuno-Fujiwara, & Postlewaite, 1993);41 finally, it is “intuitive” (Cho
& Kreps, 1987). Therefore, the analysis is centered on a focal and important equilibrium
that possesses a number of appealing qualities. In addition, the results about welfare would
carry through even if we were to consider the whole class of perfect Bayesian equilibria
that survive the Intuitive Criterion and focus on the sets of equilibrium payoffs.42 In
Appendix A.1, I show all the perfect Bayesian equilibria of the communication subgame
that survive the Intuitive Criterion (Proposition A.1).
Withholding Information. The baseline model does not allow the media outlet
to withhold his private information. Here, I consider an extension that accommodates
for this possibility. Let the outlet’s report space be R = Θ ∪ {∅}, where ∅ denotes
the act of withholding information. This act may be costly for several reasons: e.g., it
may require an active act of suppression, or it may induce a reputation loss. Say that
withholding information comes at a cost kC(∅, θ) = ω ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ. The rest of the
model remains as before. I will use the terms “silence” and “withholding information”
interchangeably.
The introduction of silence does not dismiss the equilibrium of the baseline model
(Section 4), no matter the cost ω. To see this, consider the equilibrium of the communication subgame in Lemma 1 (or in Proposition A.1), and suppose that the voter reacts
skeptically to silence: when the outlet is more likely to support the incumbent (resp. the
challenger) than the voter, the voter replies to silence by casting a ballot for the challenger
(resp. the incumbent). That is, beliefs are such that β(∅) = c if τm (q) < τv (q), and
40

In a similar setting with simultaneous policy proposals and cheap talk communication, Chakraborty
and Ghosh (2016) characterize the candidates’ mixed-strategy equilibrium for different levels of conflict
of interest between the media outlet and the voter.
41
See Lemmata B.1 and B.2 in Appendix B.
42
To see this, notice that the multiplicity of PBE in the communication subgame (Proposition A.1 in
Appendix A.1) yields a convex set W(k) of payoffs that the voter can obtain in equilibrium (Corollary B.1
in Appendix B.3). Since changes in the intensity of misreporting costs k affect only the lower bound of
W(k), the focus on the voter’s worst-case scenario is without loss of generality.
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β(∅) = i if τm (q) > τv (q). No matter what is the cost of withholding information, the
outlet can never gain by deviating from the prescribed strategy with silence. Therefore,
the results in Sections 4 and 5 carry through this extension.
It remains important to understand whether the introduction of silence generates
alternative equilibria where the media outlet withholds information to persuade the voter.
To this end, I first consider the case where withholding information comes at no cost.
In this case, both babbling and cheap talk equilibria are restored.43 However, babbling
equilibria fail the Intuitive Criterion test, and influential equilibria with costless silence
are equivalent to the case in the baseline model where k = 0. Therefore, this last special
case defies the paper’s purpose of studying costly communication. Consider now the case
where withholding information comes at a cost ω > 0. I show that, no matter how small
the cost ω is, there is no perfect sequential equilibrium where the outlet persuades the
voter by withholding information (Lemma B.5, Supplemental Appendix B).44 Therefore,
all results carry through when the media outlet can withhold information.

6.2

Additional Discussion

This section provides further discussion on some aspects of the baseline model.
Political Gains. If ξ are resources that the winning candidate inefficiently allocates
to the media outlet as a reward for her support, then we should take this into account
when calculating the voter’s welfare. Recall that, since equilibrium policies q ∗ (k) satisfy
condition (1) for every finite k, the media outlet always exerts full persuasion and the
candidate preferred by the outlet is always elected. Therefore, we can simply subtract ξ
from the equilibrium welfare of the voter Wv∗ , and all results would be unchanged.
Regulation Costs. In this paper, I abstract from regulation costs. However, carrying
out interventions typically comes at a cost that should be accounted for when computing
the voter’s welfare. Since results about welfare would be highly dependent from the
assumptions we make on regulation costs, I leave these costs out from the current
analysis.45 Intuitively, assuming sufficiently high regulation costs would break down the
monotonicity result in Proposition 2. However, as noted before, Proposition 2 implicitly
shows that lenient interventions are detrimental for the voter’s welfare when misreporting
costs k are sufficiently low. This result holds true as long as regulation costs are positive,
no matter their shape and how small they are.
43

In a babbling equilibrium, the outlet always deliver ∅, and the voter casts a ballot based on her
prior only. In a cheap talk equilibrium where τm (q) < τv (q), the outlet reports truthfully when θ ≤ τm (q)
and withholds information otherwise. Silence is persuasive if Ef [θ|θ > τm (q)] = (φ + τm (q))/2 ≥ τv (q),
which is always satisfied given that φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 .
44
Differently than in the baseline model, in this extension the outlet may prefer different equilibria at
the interim stage. As a result, we cannot select the sender-preferred equilibrium.
45
Moreover, it is not clear which functional form would be more appropriate to describe regulation
costs. For example, interventions that decrease the costs’ intensity k may free up resources but they
would also require time and effort.

30
https://services.bepress.com/feem/paper1394

32

Vaccari: Influential News and Policy-making

Misreporting Costs. I assume that the media outlet incurs misreporting costs that
are continuously increasing with the size of the lie. This assumption is grounded on the
following observations: first, credibly reporting a gross distortion of the truth requires
more time and effort than reporting just a slight stretch of the truth; second, “bigger lies”
are more likely to be detected and also lead to a larger reputation loss. More discussion on
misreporting costs is provided by Kartik (2009) and Kartik et al. (2007), among others.
The use of continuous misreporting costs (and thus continuous report and state spaces)
is not only a sensible assumption, but it is also important for our qualitative findings. For
example, consider a discrete variant of the model with three states (high, medium, low)
and a fixed lying cost k > 0 that the outlet incurs when r 6= θ. In this case, small changes
in k would, in general, have no effect. When accounting for regulation costs, this implies
that lenient interventions necessarily damage the voter’s welfare. I show that this result
is not a byproduct of having a discrete state space and fixed misreporting costs.
Tie-breaking Rule. The “sender-preferred” part of the equilibrium concept implies
that, when indifferent, the challenger best replies to the incumbent with a policy that
is closer to the outlet’s bliss ϕm . From Section 4.2 we know that when k ∈ (0, k̄/4)
the challenger strictly prefers to propose ϕm , while for finite k ≥ k̄/4 she is indifferent
between proposing the voter’s bliss ϕv or a biased policy. Therefore, the main qualitative
results would carry through even if the challenger were to break indifference in favor
to the voter rather than the media outlet: in this case, policy convergence occurs at
k ∈ (0, k̄/4), and then divergence occurs due to a discontinuity at k = k̄/4, where also the
voter’s welfare and the persuasion rate would jump to higher values. As k increases, the
incumbent’s policy becomes increasingly populist while the challenger keeps proposing ϕv .
It follows that, as k increases further, the voter’s welfare increases while the persuasion
rate decreases.

7

Conclusion

This article studies the voter’s welfare in relation to interventions that affect media outlets’
misreporting costs. The results provide a number of policy implications. As intuition
would suggest, interventions that increase the costs of misreporting information never
make the voter worse off. However, lenient regulatory efforts might be futile and thus
wasteful when accounting for their implementation costs. In these cases, a regulator should
either do nothing or enforce substantial measures. I provide conditions under which the
voter is better off without a media outlet or with a period of pre-election silence.
The presence of an influential and biased media outlet generates both policy and
informational distortions. As a result, higher misreporting costs might be associated
with more persuasion and a worse selection of candidates, but they can still increase the
voter’s welfare because of a reduction in policy distortions. Therefore, regulatory efforts
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such as “fake news laws” ought not to be judged solely by their impact on misreporting
behavior. This type of intervention should not be designed with the objective of reducing or
eliminating disinformation: full revelation can be achieved with relatively low misreporting
costs, but the induced policy distortion would minimize the voter’s welfare.
Importantly, electoral incentives skew the process of regulation as politicians strategically choose interventions to maximize their own chances of electoral victory. For purely
instrumental reasons, the incumbent government deliberately pursues interventions that
minimize the voter’s welfare. These kind of friction in the regulatory process persists even
when the challenger is in charge of regulation.

A
A.1

Appendix
The Communication Subgame

The communication subgame Γ̂ starts after the policy-making stage, where both candidates
make binding commitments to policy proposals. In this section, I assume that the
proposed policies q = (qi , qc ) are such that τm (q) < τv (q). Since policies are fixed, in
this section I simplify the notation by using τj ≡ τj (q), ρ(θ) ≡ ρ(θ, q), p(θ|r, q) ≡ p(θ|r),
and β(r) ≡ β(r, q). I use the term “generic equilibrium” to denote a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂ that is robust to the Intuitive Criterion
(Cho & Kreps, 1987). A “sender-preferred equilibrium” of the communication subgame Γ̂
is the generic equilibrium preferred by the media outlet, as defined in Section 3.
Proposition A.1 builds on Lemmata A.1 to A.5 and shows all the generic equilibria46
of Γ̂. The proofs of Proposition A.1 and of all its supporting lemmata use a full-support
and continuous prior f (not necessarily uniform) and a general misreporting cost function
kC(r, θ), where k > 0 and C(·, ·) is continuous on R × Θ with C(r, θ) ≥ 0 for all r ∈ R
and θ ∈ Θ, C(x, x) = 0 for all x ∈ Θ. The cost function C(·) satisfies C(r, θ) > C(r0 , θ) if
|r − θ| > |r0 − θ| for all θ ∈ Θ, and C(r, θ) > C(r, θ0 ) if |r − θ| > |r − θ0 | for all r ∈ R. I
redefine the functions l(r) and h(r) for a general cost C(r, θ) as follows: for a r > τm , l(r) =
max {τm , min {θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ}}; for a r < τm , h(r) = min {τm , max {θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ}}. For
consistency with the rest of the paper, Lemma 1 is expressed in terms of the cost function
C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 and uniform prior f .
The set of all the voter’s pure strategy best responses to a report r and posterior

46

A sufficient condition on the state space for the existence
of all generic equilibria
in Proposition A.1
n
o
p
is, for proposals q such that τv (q) > τm (q), φ ≥ max τv (q) + ξ/k, −τm (q) . In this section I assume
that such a condition is always satisfied.
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beliefs p(·|r) such that

R
θ∈T

p(θ|r)dθ = 1 is defined as47
[

B(T, r) =
p:

R
T

p(θ|r)dθ=1

Z
arg max
b∈{i,c}

p(θ|r)uv (b, θ, q)dθ.
θ∈Θ

Fix an equilibrium outcome and let u∗m (θ) denote the outlet’s expected equilibrium payoff
in state θ. The set of states for which delivering report r is not equilibrium-dominated for
the outlet is


∗
J(r) = θ ∈ Θ um (θ) ≤ max um (r, b, θ, q) .
b∈B(Θ,r)

An equilibrium does not survive the Intuitive Criterion refinement if there exists a state
θ0 ∈ Θ such that, for some report r0 , u∗m (θ0 ) < minb∈B(J(r0 ),r0 ) um (r0 , b, θ0 , q).
In Lemma A.5, I use the following notation to denote the limits of the reporting rule
ρ(·) as θ approaches state t from, respectively, above and below: ρ+ (t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and
ρ− (t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
Lemma A.1. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(θ) is non-decreasing in θ < τm and θ > τm .
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that there are two states θ00 > θ0 > τm
such that ρ(θ0 ) > ρ(θ00 ). We can rule out that β(ρ(θ0 )) = β(ρ(θ00 )) = c, as in such case the
equilibrium would prescribe ρ(θ0 ) = θ0 < θ00 = ρ(θ00 ). If β(ρ(θ0 )) = β(ρ(θ00 )) = i, then in at
least one of the two states θ0 , θ00 the outlet could profitably deviate by delivering the report
prescribed in the other state. Consider the case where β(ρ(θ0 )) = i (c) and β(ρ(θ00 )) = c
(i). In equilibrium, it has to be that ρ(θ00 ) = θ00 (ρ(θ0 ) = θ0 ). Given ρ(θ0 ) > ρ(θ00 ) = θ00 > θ0
(θ00 > θ0 = ρ(θ0 ) > ρ(θ00 )) and C(ρ(θ0 ), θ00 ) < C(ρ(θ0 ), θ0 ) (C(ρ(θ00 ), θ00 ) > C(ρ(θ00 ), θ0 )),
the outlet could profitably deviate in state θ00 (θ0 ) by reporting ρ(θ0 ) (ρ(θ00 )). A similar
argument applies for any two states θ0 < θ00 < τm , completing the proof.
Lemma A.2. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, if ρ(θ) is strictly monotonic and continuous
in an open interval, then ρ(θ) = θ for all θ in such an interval.
Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that the reporting rule ρ(·) is strictly
increasing (decreasing) and continuous in an open interval (a, b), but ρ(θ) > θ for some
θ ∈ (a, b). There always exist an  > 0 such that the media outlet prefers the same
alternative in both states θ and θ − , and θ < ρ(θ − ) < ρ(θ) (resp. ρ(θ − ) > ρ(θ) > θ).
The media outlet never pays misreporting costs to implement its least preferred alternative;
therefore, it must be that β(ρ(θ)) = β(ρ(θ − )). Since C(ρ(θ − ), θ) < C(ρ(θ), θ) (resp.
C(ρ(θ), θ − ) < C(ρ(θ − ), θ − )), the media outlet has a profitable deviation in state θ
(resp. θ − ), contradicting that ρ(·) is in equilibrium.
Lemma A.3. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τm .
47

For T = ∅, I set B(∅, r) = B(Θ, r).
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Proof. Consider a generic equilibrium and suppose that ρ(θ) 6= θ for all θ ∈ S, where S is
an open set such that sup S ≤ τm and S ⊂ Θ. Beliefs must be such that β(r) = i for all
r ∈ S. Suppose that a report r0 ∈ S is off-path. It must be that u∗m (θ) ≥ um (r0 , i, θ, q)
for all θ ≥ τm . Since sup J(r0 ) ≤ τm < τv and B(J(r0 ), r0 ) = c, the outlet can profitably
deviate by reporting truthfully when θ = r0 ∈ S. Hence, all reports r ∈ S must be on-path.
To have β(r0 ) = i for a r0 ∈ S, it must be that ρ(θ0 ) = r0 for some θ0 ≥ τv . In all states
θ > τm such that ρ(θ) ∈ S, the outlet must deliver the same least expensive report r0 ∈ S
such that β(r0 ) = i. Thus, S has measure zero and ρ(θ) = θ for almost every θ ≤ τm .
Lemma A.4. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(·) is discontinuous at some θ ∈ Θ.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a generic equilibrium where ρ(θ)
is continuous in Θ. From Lemma A.3, we know that ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ τm . If ρ(θ) = θ
also for all θ > τm , then the equilibrium would be fully revealing. In such case, the outlet
could profitably deviate by reporting τv when the state is θ ∈ (τv − , τv ) for some  > 0.
Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ0 ) 6= θ0 for some state θ0 > τm . By Lemma A.2, it has to
be that ρ(θ0 ) < θ0 , or otherwise ρ(·) would be discontinuous; therefore Lemmata A.1 and
A.2 imply that ρ(θ) = ρ(θ0 ) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ(θ0 ), τm }, sup Θ). There always exists a
report r0 ≥ θ0 such that inf J(r0 ) ≥ max{ρ(θ0 ), τm }. Since β(ρ(θ0 )) = i, it must be that
B(J(r0 ), r0 ) = i. Therefore, there are states where the media outlet would have a profitable
deviation, contradicting that a continuous ρ(·) can be part of a generic equilibrium.
Lemma A.5. In a generic equilibrium of Γ̂, ρ(·) has a unique discontinuity in state θδ ,
where θδ ∈ [τm , τv ]. The reporting rule48 is such that ρ(θ) = ρ+ (θδ ) > θδ = l(ρ+ (θδ )) for
θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )) and ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ∈ (inf Θ, θδ ) ∪ [ρ+ (θδ ), sup Θ).
Proof. I denote by θδ the lowest state in which a discontinuity of ρ(·) occurs. By Lemmata A.3 and A.4, we know that in equilibrium such a discontinuity exists and θδ ≥ τm .
Suppose that ρ− (θδ ) 6= θδ . If ρ− (θδ ) < θδ , then by Lemmata A.1 and A.2 we have that
ρ(θ) = ρ− (θδ ) for all θ ∈ (max{ρ− (θδ ), τm }, θδ ) and ρ(θ) = θ for θ ≤ max{ρ− (θδ ), τm }.
In equilibrium, it has to be that β(ρ− (θδ )) = i and β(r0 ) = c for every off-path r0 ∈
(max{ρ− (θδ ), τm }, θδ ). Hence, every report r0 ∈ (max{ρ− (θδ ), τm }, θδ ) is equilibrium
dominated for all θ < θ0 , where θ0 = {θ ∈ Θ | C(ρ− (θδ ), θ) = C(r0 , θ)}. Therefore,
B(J(r0 ), r0 ) = i, and the media outlet could profitably deviate by reporting r0 instead
of ρ− (θδ ) when θ ∈ (θ0 , θδ ). Suppose now that ρ− (θδ ) > θδ . By Lemma A.1 we have
ρ− (τm ) = τm , and thus it has to be that θδ > τm . Similarly to the previous case, in
equilibrium it must be that ρ(θ) = ρ− (θδ ) for all θ ∈ (τm , θδ ). This is in contradiction
to θδ being the lowest discontinuity, as we would have ρ+ (τm ) > τm . Therefore, in every
generic equilibrium, ρ− (θδ ) = θδ ≥ τm and ρ(θ) = θ for θ < θδ .
48

Recall that ρ+ (t) = limθ→t+ ρ(θ) and ρ− (t) = limθ→t− ρ(θ).
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From Lemmata A.1 and A.2, it follows that ρ+ (θδ ) > θδ and ρ(θ) = ρ+ (θδ ) for every
θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )]: since it must be that β(ρ+ (θδ )) = i, the outlet would profitably deviate
by reporting ρ+ (θδ ) in every state θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )] such that ρ(θ) > ρ+ (θδ ). To prevent
other profitable deviations, ρ+ (θδ ) must be such that ξ ≤ kC(ρ+ (θδ ), θ) for θ ∈ (τm , θδ )
and ξ ≥ kC(ρ+ (θδ ), θ) for all θ ∈ [θδ , ρ+ (θδ )]. Together, these conditions imply that
θδ = l(ρ+ (θδ )). Any off-path report r0 > ρ+ (θδ ) would be equilibrium-dominated by all
θ ≤ ρ+ (θδ ), yielding B(J(r0 ), r0 ) = i. Therefore, it must be that ρ(θ) = θ for all θ ≥ ρ+ (θδ ),
and ρ(θ) = ρ+ (θδ ) for θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ )).
Suppose now that θδ > τv . Given the reporting rule, posterior beliefs p must be
degenerate on θ = r for all r ∈ [τv , θδ ). In this case, there always exists an  > 0 such
that the outlet can profitably deviate by reporting τv instead of θ in states θ ∈ (τv − , τv ).
Therefore, θδ ∈ [τm , τv ].
For the next proposition, define
r̄(θ) = max{r ∈ Θ|kC(r, θ) = ξ},
χ = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τv , r̄(τv ))].
When C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 and f is uniform, we have r̄(θ) = θ +

p

ξ/k and χ = τv + 12

p
ξ/k.

Proposition A.1. A pair (ρ(θ), p(θ | r)) is a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ if and only if, for
a given λ ∈ [τv , χ],
i) The reporting rule ρ(θ) is, for a λ ∈ [τv , χ),

r̂(λ) = {r ∈ Θ | E [θ|θ ∈ (l(r), r)] = λ}
f
ρ(θ) =
θ

if θ ∈ (l (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ))
otherwise.

When λ = χ, ρ(θ) = r̂(λ) for θ ∈ [l(r̂(λ)), r̂(λ)), and ρ(θ) = θ otherwise.49
ii) Posterior beliefs p(θ | r) are according to Bayes’ rule whenever possible and such
that Ep [θ |r̂(λ)] = λ, Ep [θ |r] < τv for every off-path r, and p(θ | r) are degenerate on
θ = r otherwise.
Proof. Given the reporting rule ρ(·) described in Lemma A.5, beliefs p must be such
that β(ρ+ (θδ )) = i, and thus Ep [θ | ρ+ (θδ )] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (θδ , ρ+ (θδ ))] ≥ τv , where θδ =
l(ρ+ (θδ )) ≤ τv and ρ+ (θδ ) > τvn
. With square loss misreporting
costs C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 ,
o
p
we have that l(ρ+ (θδ )) = max ρ+ (θδ ) − ξ/k, τm . Since θδ = l(ρ+ (θδ )) ≤ τv , we also
obtain that Ep [θ | ρ+ (θδ )] ≤ χ. Therefore, the expectation Ep [θ | ρ+ (θδ )] induced by the
49

Up to changes of measure zero in ρ(θ) due to the media outlet being indifferent between reporting
l(r̂(λ)) and r̂(λ) when the state is θ = l(r̂(λ)) > τm .
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report ρ+ (θδ ) has to be between τv and χ. For quadratic costs C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 and
p
uniform prior f , the expectation Ep [θ | ρ+ (θδ )] has to be between τv and τv + 12 ξ/k. I
define the pooling report r̂(λ) as
r̂(λ) := {r ∈ R | Ef [θ | l(r) < θ < r] = λ} .
For a λ ∈ [τv , χ), we can rewrite the reporting rule described in Lemma A.5 as

ρ(θ) =


r̂(λ)

if θ ∈ (l (r̂(λ)) , r̂(λ))

θ

otherwise.

(2)

Alternatively, (2) can have ρ(l(r̂(λ)) = r̂(λ) as long as l(r̂(λ)) > τm . If λ = χ, then it
must be that (2) has ρ(l(r̂(χ))) = r̂(χ), where l(r̂(χ)) = τv ; otherwise the outlet could
profitably deviate50 by reporting τv when the state is θ ∈ (τv − , τv + ) for some  > 0
(recall that the voter would select the incumbent when indifferent). When θ ∼ U and
p
C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 , we have r̂(λ) = λ + 12 ξ/k if l(r̂(λ)) > τm and r̂(λ) = 2λ − τm
otherwise.
By applying Bayes’ rule to (2), we obtain that posterior beliefs p(θ|r) are such that
Ep [θ | r̂(λ)] = λ ∈ [τv , χ], and are degenerate on θ = r for all r ∈
/ [l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)). For
0
0
every off-path report r ∈ (l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)) it must be that Ep [θ | r ] < τv to have β(r0 ) = c.
These off-path beliefs are consistent with the Intuitive Criterion since for every r0 ∈
(l (r̂ (λ)) , r̂ (λ)) we have that inf J(r0 ) < l(r̂(λ)) ≤ τv , and thus c ∈ B(J(r0 ), r0 ). The proof
is completed by the observation that the pair (ρ(θ), p(θ|r)) described in Proposition A.1
is indeed a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ for every λ ∈ [τv , χ].
Proof of Lemma 1. For the case τm < τv , Proposition A.1 shows that there is a continuum of generic equilibria of Γ̂ parameterized by the
λi = Ep [θ|r̂(λ)]. Given
h expectation
p
a uniform prior f , costs C(r, θ) = (r − θ)2 , λ ∈ τv , τv + 12 ξ/k , and τm < τv , in a
generic equilibrium there is persuasion when θ ∈ (l(r̂(λ)), τv ). Therefore,
λ = τv maxi
i
p
mizes the media outlet’s expected equilibrium payoff: for every λ ∈ τv , τv + 12 ξ/k , if
l(r̂(τv )) > τm , then l(r̂(λ)) > l(r̂(τv )); if l(r̂(τv )) = τm , then l(r̂(λ)) ≥ τm and r̂(λ) > r̂(τv ).
That is, in the generic equilibrium where λ = τv , the media outlet is either more likely
to persuade the voter at the same expected cost, or is at least equally likely to persuade
the voter at a strictly lower cost compared to generic equilibria where λ > τv . The
sender-preferred equilibrium reporting rule ρ(·) and beliefs p follow from Proposition A.1,
where the case τm > τv is obtained in a similar way as τm < τv , and the case τm = τv
follows by setting τm → τv in the generic equilibrium of Proposition A.1 where λ = τv .
50

This is because the voter would break indifference in favour of the incumbent. If the outlet reports
r = τv if and only if θ = τv , then we would get β(τv ) = i, thus generating a profitable deviation for types
around τv .
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A.2

The Policy-making Stage

A.2.1

The Challenger’s Best Response

Given the equilibrium of the communication subgame Γ̂ (see Lemma 1) and a policy
proposal by the incumbent qi , the expected utility of the challenger is Vc (q) = l(r∗ (q))
if τm (q) < τv (q), and Vc (q) = h(r∗ (q)) if τm (q) > τv (q). We have that τm (q) = τv (q)
only if qc = qi ; in this case, the challenger ensures her electoral victory half the time by
mimicking the incumbent’s proposal, and Vc (q) = 0. By contrast, τv (q) > τm (q) when
qc > qi , and τv (q) < τm (q) otherwise. I define the “best response to the left” BRcL (qi ) as
the best response of the challenger to policy qi subject to the constraint that qc ≤ qi , that
is, BRcL (qi ) = arg maxqc ≤qi Vc (q). The “best response to the right” is similarly defined as
BRcR (qi ) = arg maxqc ≥qi Vc (q).
Step 1. The challenger’s “best response to the left” BRcL (qi ) is,

BRcL (qi ) =




qi






ϕ m

√ξ



q̃c (qi ) = qi −






ϕ

k

4γ(ϕv −ϕm )

v

if qi ≤ ϕm

√ξ 
k
if qi ∈ ϕm , ϕm + 4γ(ϕv −ϕ
m)

√ξ
k
if qi ∈ ϕm + 4γ(ϕv −ϕ
, ϕv +
m)
√ξ
k
if qi ≥ ϕv + 4γ(ϕv −ϕ
m)

√ξ



k

4γ(ϕv −ϕm )

Proof. Given qc < qi and the 
equilibrium in Lemma
θ <
 1, the challenger

 wins when
q
q
ξ
ξ
1
∗
∗
∗
∗
h(r (q)), where h(r (q)) = min r (q) + k , τm (q) and r (q) = max τv (q) − 2 k , 2τv (q) − τm (q) .
q
∗
When h(r∗ (q)) < τm (q), the pooling report is r∗ (q) = τv (q) − 12 kξ , and thus ∂h(r∂qc(q)) =
m (q)
2γ(ϕv − qc ) > 0 and ∂τ∂q
= 2γ(ϕm − qc ) < 0 for all qc ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ]. Thus, the expected
c
utility of the challenger Vc (q) = h(r∗ (q)) is maximized, subject to qc < qi , when qc is such
that h(r∗ (q)) = τm (q). This last equality is satisfied when qc = q̃c (qi ), where

q
q̃c (qi ) = qi −

ξ
k

4γ(ϕv − ϕm )

.

(3)

Therefore, as long as q̃c (qi ) ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ], we have that BRcL (qi ) = q̃c (qi ). Since policies
qj ∈
/ [ϕm , ϕv ], j ∈ {i, c}, are never optimal, it follows that if q̃c (qi ) < ϕm ≤ qi , then
BRcL (qi ) = ϕm ; if qi < ϕm , then BRcL (qi ) = qi ; if q̃c (qi ) > ϕv , then BRcL (qi ) = ϕv . The
proof is completed by solving for these inequalities.
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Step 2. The challenger’s “best response from the right” BRcR (qi ) is,

BRcR (qi ) =



ϕ

q

if qi < ϕv −

v

r q
1
2γ

ξ
k

otherwise.

i

Proof. Given qc > qi and the equilibrium in Lemma 1, the challenger wins the election
∗
∗
when θ < l(r∗ (q)). Since ∂l(r∂qc(q)) = ∂h(r∂qc(q)) , we can proceed as in Step 1: the policy qc
such that l(r∗ (q)) = τm (q) minimizes Vc (q) subject to qc ≥ qi , and thus BRcR (qi ) = ϕv as
long as l(r∗ (qi , ϕv )) > 0. Otherwise, the challenger would be better off by imitating the
incumbent with qc = qi , thereby ensuring
a payoff of Vc (q) = 0. The condition
q herself
p
1
∗
l(r (qi , ϕv )) > 0 is satisfied by qi < ϕv − 2γ ξ/k, completing the proof.
Proposition A.2. The challenger’s best response BRc (qi ) to a policy qi ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ] is,


ϕv







q − η(k)

 i
BRc (qi ) = ϕv





ϕm




q − η(k)
i

if qi
if qi
if qi
if qi
if qi

√ξ
where η(k) =

k

4γ(ϕv −ϕm )

and k̄ =

q i
h
∈ ϕm , ϕv + η(k) − 4 γ ξ2 k and k ≥ k̄
q
h
i
∈ ϕv + η(k) − 4 γ ξ2 k , ϕv and k ≥ k̄



m
− η(k) and k ∈ 0, k̄
∈ ϕm , ϕv +ϕ
2



m
∈ ϕv +ϕ
−
η(k),
ϕ
+
η(k)
and
k
∈
0,
k̄
m
2

∈ [ϕm + η(k), ϕv ] and k ∈ 0, k̄ ,

ξ
.
γ 2 (ϕv −ϕm )4

Proof. Given a policy qi ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ] and best responses BRcL (qi ), BRcR (qi ) as in Steps 1 and
∂Vc (qi ,BRcL (qi ))
∂Vc (qi ,BRcR (qi ))
2, we have that
≤0≤
. Therefore, if there is a qi0 ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ]
∂qi
∂qi


such that Vc qi0 , BRcR (qi0 ) = Vc qi0 , BRcL (qi0 ) , then BRc (qi ) = BRcR (qi ) for all qi ∈ [ϕm , qi0 ]
and BRc (qi ) = BRcL (qi ) for all qi ∈ [qi0 , ϕv ]. As a first step, I compare Vc (qi , q̃c (qi )) and
Vc (qi , ϕv ). When qc < qi and (qc − qi )2 ≤ 16γ 2 k(ϕξm −ϕv )2 , we have that h(r∗ (qi , qc )) =
τm (qi , qc ), and q
therefore Vc (qi , q̃c (qi )) = τm (qi , q̃c (qi )) and Vc (qi , ϕv ) = l(r∗ (qi , ϕv )) =
γ(ϕv − qi )2 − 21
q̃c (qi ) is

ξ
.
k

The challenger’s expected utility from “best replying to the left” with

1
Vc (qi , q̃c (qi )) =
2

r

q



q



ξ
k

ξ

ξ
k

− γ 2(ϕv − qi ) +
.
k
4γ(ϕv − ϕm ) 4γ(ϕv − ϕm )

Thus, the condition τm (qi , q̃c (qi )) = l(r∗ (qi , ϕv )) can be rewritten as
q
2

γ(ϕv − qi ) + 2γ

ξ
k

4γ(ϕv − ϕm )


(ϕv − qi ) + γ 

q

ξ
k

4γ(ϕv − ϕm )

2
 −

q

ξ
k

= 0.
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By solving a quadratic equation in (ϕv − qi ), I obtain that the threshold q̄ 0 such that


Vc q̄ 0 , BRcR (q̄ 0 ) = Vc q̄ 0 , BRcL (q̄ 0 ) is,
q
q̄ 0 = ϕv +

ξ
k

s

4γ(ϕv − ϕm )

ξ

4

−

γ 2k

.

Since Vc (qi , qi ) = 0, I do not need to consider the case where BRcR (qi ) = qi as the
challenger can always get a positive expected utility Vc (qi , qc0 ) = γ(qc0 − qi )2 ≥ 0 by
proposing qc0 = max{ϕm , q̃c (qi )}. Since BRcL (qi ) = ϕm when q̃c (qi ) < ϕm and qi ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ],
the comparison between Vc (qi , q̃c (qi )) and Vc (qi , ϕv ) makes sense as long as q̃c (qi ) ≥ ϕm
c (qi )
= 1, the condition is q̃c (q̄ 0 ) ≥ ϕm or k ≥ k̄, where
for all qi ∈ [q̄ 0 , ϕv ]. Given that ∂ q̃∂q
i
k̄ =

γ 2 (ϕ

ξ
.
4
v − ϕm )


If k ∈ 0, k̄ , then we have that q̃c (qi ) < ϕm and thus BRcL (qi ) = ϕm for some qi ≥ q̄ 0 . In
this case, the relevant comparison is between Vc (qi , ϕm ) = τm (qi , ϕm ) and Vc (qi , ϕv ): by
equating τm (qi , ϕm ) = l(r∗ (qi , ϕv )) we get that the threshold is
q

ξ

ϕv + ϕm
k
q̄ =
−
.
2
4γ(ϕv − ϕm )
00

√ξ

k
Note that q̄ 0 = q̄ 00 = ϕm + 4γ(ϕv −ϕ
when
k
=
k̄.
Therefore,
when
k
∈
0,
k̄
we have
)
m
that BRc (qi ) = ϕv for all qi ∈ [ϕm , q̄ 00 ] and BRc (qi ) = BRcL (qi ) for qi ∈ [q̄ 00 , ϕv ]. Moreover,
BRcL (qi ) = q̃c (qi ) as long as q̃c (qi ) ≥ ϕm , and BRcL (qi ) = ϕm otherwise. We have that
q̃c (qi ) ≥ ϕm when qi ≥ q̄ 000 , where
q
000

q̄ = ϕm +

ξ
k

4γ(ϕv − ϕm )

.

√ξ
The proposition follows by replacing η(k) =
A.2.2

k

4γ(ϕv −ϕm )

.

Equilibrium Policy-making

Proof of Proposition 1. I denote by V̂i (qi ) ≡ Vi (qi , BRc (qi )) the utility of the incumbent given that qi ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ] and qc = BRc (qi ), where the challenger’s best response
BRc (qi ) is as in Proposition A.2. Since an equilibrium is a sender-preferred PBE, when
the challenger is indifferent between some policies, she selects the policy that is closer to
the media outlet’s bliss ϕm . Given that h(r∗ (qi , qc )) = τm (qi , qc ) for qc = max{ϕm , q̃c (qi )},
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we have that


−l(r∗ (qi , ϕv ))







−τ (q , q̃ (q ))

 m i c i
V̂i (qi ) = −l(r∗ (qi , ϕv ))



−τ (q , ϕ )


m i
m



−τ (q , q̃ (q ))
m i c i

q 
h
if qi ∈ ϕm , ϕv + η(k) − 4 γ ξ2 k and k ≥ k̄
q
h
i
if qi ∈ ϕv + η(k) − 4 γ ξ2 k , ϕv and k ≥ k̄



m
if qi ∈ ϕm , ϕv +ϕ
−
η(k)
and
k
∈
0,
k̄
2
 ϕv +ϕm


if qi ∈
− η(k), ϕm + η(k) and k ∈ 0, k̄
2

if qi ∈ [ϕm + η(k), ϕv ] and k ∈ 0, k̄ ,

√

where η(k) =

ξ/k
4γ(ϕq
v −ϕm )

q̄ 0 = ϕv + η(k) −

4

ξ
,
γ2k

and k̄ =
q̄ 00 =

ξ
.
γ 2 (ϕv −ϕm )4

ϕv +ϕm
2

Henceforth, I will use the following notation:

− η(k), and q̄ 000 = ϕm + η(k).

When k ≥ k̄, the utility V̂i (qi ) is increasing in qi until qi = q̄ 0 , and decreasing afterwards,
i (qi )
i (qi )
as ∂ V̂∂q
= 2γ(ϕv − qi ) > 0 for qi ∈ [ϕm , q̄ 0 ] and ∂ V̂∂q
= 2γ(ϕm − qi ) < 0 for qi ∈ [q̄ 0 , ϕv ].
i
i
Since −l(r∗ (q̄ 0 , ϕv )) = −τm (qi , q̃c (qi )), it follows that qi = q̄ 0 maximizes V̂i (qi ) for k ≥ k̄.
The challenger replies to qi = q̄ 0 with the sender-preferred policy qc = q̃c (q̄ 0 ).
There are three different configurations to consider when the misreporting costs are
lower than k̄: (i) when k̄4 ≤ k < k̄, the relevant thresholds are contained within the bliss
k̄
policies of the voter and the media outlet, ϕm ≤ q̄ 00 < q̄ 000 < ϕv ; (ii) when 16
≤ k < k̄4 , the
threshold q̄ 00 is lower than the media outlet’s bliss ϕm , and we have q̄ 00 < ϕm < q̄ 000 ≤ ϕv ;
k̄
(iii) when 0 < k < 16
, both thresholds are beyond the bliss policies, q̄ 00 < ϕm < ϕv < q̄ 000 .


∗
i (qi )
In the first case, where k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ , we have that ∂ V̂∂q
= ∂−l(r∂q(qii ,ϕv )) = 2γ(ϕv − qi ) >
i
∂ V̂i (qi )
i (qi )
= ∂−τm∂q(qii ,ϕm ) = 2γ(ϕm − qi ) < 0 for qi ∈ [q̄ 00 , q̄ 000 ]; and ∂ V̂∂q
=
∂q
i
i
√
∗
ξ/k
∂−h(r (qi ,q̃c (qi )))
= − 2(ϕv −ϕm ) < 0 for qi ∈ [q̄ 000 , ϕv ]. Since −l(r∗ (q̄ 00 , ϕv )) = −τm (q̄ 00 , ϕm )
∂qi


and −h(r∗ (qi , q̃c (qi ))) = −τm (q̄ 000 , ϕm ), we have that when k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ the incumbent
maximizes V̂i (qi ) by selecting qi = q̄ 00 , and the challenger best responds to q̄ 00 by proposing

0 for qi ∈ [ϕm , q̄ 00 ];

the sender-preferred policy qc = ϕm .
k̄
The same line of reasoning can be extended to the other two cases: when 16
≤ k < k̄4 ,
k̄
the incumbent proposes qi = q̄ 00 and the challenger replies with qc = ϕm ; when 0 < k < 16
,
both the incumbent and the challenger propose qj = ϕm , j ∈ {i, c}. The proposition
follows by denoting qi∗ (k) = arg maxqi ∈R V̂i (qi ) and qc∗ (qi , k) = min BRc (qi ).
Corollary A.1. The equilibrium in Proposition 1 exists if and only if
o
n
p
φ ≥ min γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 + 12 ξ/k, 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 .
Proof. Consider the sender-preferred equilibrium of Γ̂ in Lemma 1 and the equilibrium
policies in Proposition 1. When k ∈ (0, k̄/4], we have that q ∗ (k) = (ϕm , ϕm ). Suppose that
the challenger deviates from the prescribed equilibrium strategy by proposing qc = ϕv . If
φ < r∗ (ϕm , ϕv ), then there is no report that can convince the voter to cast a ballot for the
40
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incumbent, and the deviation would be profitable. Therefore, to ensure the existence of an
equilibrium as in Proposition 1, it is necessary that φ ≥ r∗ (ϕm , ϕv ). Given that for q such
that qj ∈ [ϕm , ϕv ], j ∈ {i, c}, τv (q) is maximized when qi = ϕm and qc = ϕv , the condition
is also sufficient. The proof is completed by τv (ϕm , ϕv ) = γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 = −τm (ϕm , ϕv ).

A.3

Voter’s Welfare

To ease notation, in this section I will use qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k) ≡ qc∗ (qi∗ (k)).
Proof of Proposition 2. Proposition 1 shows that equilibrium policies q ∗ (k) are such
that qi∗ (k) ≥ qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) for every k > 0. Moreover, since (qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) − qi∗ (k))2 ≤ 16γ 2 k(ϕξm −ϕv )2 ,
we have that h(r∗ (q ∗ (k))) = τm (q ∗ (k)) for every k > 0. Given the equilibrium of the
communication subgame Γ̂ (Proposition A.1 and Lemma 1) and that θ ∼ U[−φ, φ], the
(q ∗ (k))
incumbent wins with ex-ante probability φ−τm2φ
. When the incumbent is elected,
the voter receives an expected utility of −γ(ϕv − qi∗ (k))2 + Ef [θ|θ > τm (q ∗ (k))], where
∗
Ef [θ|θ > τm (q ∗ (k))] = φ+τm2(q (k)) . When the challenger is elected, the voter obtains a
utility of −γ(ϕv − qc∗ (qi∗ (k)))2 . Therefore, the voter’s equilibrium welfare can be written as
Wv∗ (k)



τm (q ∗ (k)) + φ 
=
−γ(ϕv − qc∗ (qi∗ (k)))2
2φ



φ + τm (q ∗ (k))
φ − τm (q ∗ (k))
∗
2
−γ(ϕv − qi (k)) +
.
+
2φ
2


(4)


When k ∈ 0, k̄/4 , since τm (q) = 0 for q = (ϕm , ϕm ), equation (4) reduces to
Wv∗ (k) = −γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 + φ/4. Therefore, the voter’s equilibrium welfare Wv∗ (k) is

independent of k for all k ∈ 0, k̄/4 .


Consider now the case where k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ . The derivative of the voter’s welfare with
respect to the misreporting costs k is
∂Wv∗ (k)
=
∂k



φ − τm ( q ∗ (k))
1 ∂τm (q ∗ (k)) ∂τv (q ∗ (k))
−
2φ
2
∂k
∂k



∗
∗
1 ∂τm (q (k))
φ + τm (q (k))
∗
−
− τv (q (k)) .
2φ
∂k
2




For k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ , we obtain the following derivatives:
∂τm (q ∗ (k))
∂k

∂q ∗ (k)

∗

∂qi∗ (k)
∂k

=

(5)

ξ
1
1
√
4γ(ϕv −ϕm ) 2 ξ k2
∂q ∗ (k)

> 0,

k

i
i
= 2γ(qi∗ (k)−ϕm ) ∂k
> 0, and ∂τv (q∂k (k)) = −2γ(ϕv −qi∗ (k)) ∂k
< 0. Moreover,
∗
∗
∗
∗
notice that τv (q (k)) − τm (q (k)) = 2γ(ϕm − qi (k))(ϕv − ϕm ) and τm (q (k)) = γ(ϕm −
qi∗ (k))2 . Therefore, equation (5) can be rewritten as


∂Wv∗ (k)
γ ∂qi∗ (k) 
=
(φ − τm (q ∗ (k)))(ϕv − qi∗ (k)) − 2γ(qi∗ (k) − ϕm )2 (ϕv − ϕm ) .
∂k
φ ∂k

(6)



As k increases within k̄/4, k̄ , the term (φ − τm (q ∗ (k)))(ϕv − qi∗ (k)) continuously
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decreases while the term (qi∗ (k) − ϕm )2 (ϕv − ϕm ) continuously increases. Therefore, the
∂ 2 q ∗ (k)
∂qi∗ (k)
derivative in equation (6) is decreasing in k as φγ ∂k
> 0 and ∂ki 2 < 0. Hence, to show


∗
v (k)
that ∂W∂k
> 0. Since
> 0 for all k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ , it is sufficient to show that ∂W∂kv (k)
k=k̄

m
by assumption φ > γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 , I replace φ by γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 and qi∗ k̄ by ϕv +3ϕ
in
4
equation (6) to obtain that





2
γ (ϕv − ϕm )2 − τm qi∗ k̄ , ϕm
ϕv − qi∗ k̄ − 2γ qi∗ k̄ − ϕm (ϕv − ϕm ) > 0.


Therefore, the voter’s welfare Wv (k) is strictly increasing in k for every k ∈ k̄/4, k̄ .
Consider now the case where the misreporting costs are relatively high, k ≥ k̄. I
rewrite the welfare function in equation (4) by explicitly separating the expected gains
from quality, i.e.,
Wv∗ (k)



τm (q ∗ (k)) + φ 
−γ(ϕv − qc∗ (qi∗ (k)))2
=
2φ


2
 φ2 − τm
τm (q ∗ (k)) + φ 
(q ∗ (k))
+ 1−
−γ(ϕv − qi∗ (k))2 +
.
2φ
4φ


(7)

The threshold τm (q ∗ (k)) = γ (2ϕm − qc∗ (qi (k)) − qi∗ (k)) (qc∗ (qi (k)) − qi∗ (k)) is positive as
∗ (k))
as
qi∗ (k) > qc∗ (qi (k)) ≥ ϕm for every finite k ≥ k̄. I write the derivative ∂τm (q
∂k
∂τm (q ∗ (k))
=γ
∂k



∂qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) ∂qi∗ (k)
−
−
(qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) − qi∗ (k))
∂k
∂k
 ∗ ∗

∂qc (qi (k)) ∂qi∗ (k)
∗ ∗
∗
−
+ (2ϕm − qc (qi (k)) − qi (k))
∂k
∂k


∗
∗ ∗
γ
∂qc (qi (k)) ∂qi (k)
−
= ∗ ∗
−
(qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) − qi∗ (k))2
∗
(qc (qi (k)) − qi (k))
∂k
∂k
 ∗ ∗

∗
∂qc (qi (k)) ∂qi (k)
+ τm (q ∗ (k))
−
< 0,
∂k
∂k
∗

(k))
where we obtain ∂τm (q
< 0 because, for every finite k ≥ k̄, it is the case that qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) <
∂k
∂q ∗ (q ∗ (k))
∂qi∗ (k)
∂q ∗ (q ∗ (k))
∂qi∗ (k)
ξ
√ > 0.
qi∗ (k), c ∂ki
> ∂k
> 0, τm (q ∗ (k)) > 0, and c ∂ki
− ∂k
=
8γk2 (ϕv −ϕm ) kξ


τm (q ∗ (k))+φ
∂
1 ∂τm (q ∗ (k))
Since ∂k
= 2φ
< 0, the probability that the challenger (in2φ
∂k
cumbent) wins the election decreases (increases) as k increases. Both policies qi∗ (k)
and qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) increase with k ≥ k̄, with limk→∞ qi∗ (k) = limk→∞ qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) = ϕv . Since
ϕv > qi∗ (k) > qc∗ (qi∗ (k)) for every finite k ≥ k̄, the voter always prefers policy qi∗ (k)
to qc∗ (qi∗ (k)). Moreover, the expected gains from quality are increasing in k since
2 (q ∗ (k))
τm (q ∗ (k)) ∂τm (q ∗ (k))
φ2 −τm
∂
=
−
> 0. Therefore, as k increases, the voter has
∂k
4φ
2φ
∂k
better policy proposals, a higher probability of implementing her favorite policy, and
∗
v (k)
higher expected gains from quality. It follows that, for every finite k ≥ k̄, ∂W∂k
> 0. The
proof is completed by noting from equation (4) that limk→∞ Wv∗ (k) = Ŵv = φ/4.
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Proof of Corollary 1. In the absence of a media outlet, the median voter theorem holds
and both candidates offer ϕv . The voter, being uninformed, cannot do better than select
candidates randomly given proposals q = (ϕv , ϕv ). Therefore, the voter’s expected payoff
without a media outlet is −γ(ϕv − ϕv )2 + Ef [θ] = 0. From Proposition 2 we have that the

welfare of the voter is at its minimum for k ∈ 0, k̄/4 . Moreover, Wv∗ (k) is continuous

and increasing in k, and Wv∗ (k) = −γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 + φ/4 for all k ∈ 0, k̄/4 . Therefore, if
−γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 + φ/4 < 0 there exists a k 0 > k̄/4 such that Wv∗ (k) < 0 for all k ∈ (0, k 0 )
and Wv∗ (k) > 0 for all k > k 0 .
∗

(q (k))
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof follows directly from maximizing ι(k) = φ−τm2φ
with
∗
∗
respect to k, where q (k) is as in Proposition 1. Since τm (q (k)) > 0 for every finite k > k̄/4


and τm (q ∗ (k)) = 0 for every k ∈ 0, k̄/4 , it follows that ι(k) is maximized in k ∈ 0, k̄/4 ,
where ι(k) = 12 . Moreover, since limk→∞ τm (q ∗ (k)) = 0, then limk→∞ ι(k) = 1/2.

B
B.1

Supplementary Appendix
Multiple Media Outlets

Proof of Corollary 2. To begin, I first look at the voter’s beliefs given the outlets’
strategies. The profile {rj }M is off path either when reports are not all identical or when
{rj }M = {r0 }M for some r0 ∈ (r`∗ (q), h` (r`∗ (q))]. In the former case, the voter elects the
challenger as long as all reports are lower than or equal to r`∗ (q); if instead some sender
delivers a report that is greater than r`∗ (q), then the voter elects the incumbent. In the
latter case, the voter always elects the incumbent. The media outlets fully separate all
states higher than h` (r`∗ (q)) or lower than r`∗ (q). Therefore, in these cases the voter fully
learns the state. When all outlets deliver r`∗ (q), the voter learns that the state is between
r`∗ (q) and h` (r`∗ (q)). In this case, the voter is indifferent between the two alternatives, and
splits indifference in favor of the outlets by electing the challenger.
I now look at the outlets’ strategies given the voter’s beliefs. When the state is strictly
higher than h` (r`∗ (q)), no individual outlet can change the outcome of the election by
deviating from the prescribed strategy. Since all outlets are already reporting truthfully, no
profitable individual deviation exists. When the state is lower than r`∗ (q), all outlets report
truthfully and their preferred candidate is elected. Therefore, no profitable individual
deviation exists. When the state is in the set (r`∗ (q), h` (r`∗ (q))), all outlets are prescribed
to deliver r`∗ (q) at a cost k(r`∗ (q) − θ)2 . Since h` (r`∗ (q)) ≤ τ` (q) and τ` (q) ≤ τj (q) for all
j ∈ M , all outlets prefer the challenger over the incumbent when θ ∈ (r`∗ (q), h` (r`∗ (q))).
After observing {r`∗ (q)}M , the voter elects the challenger, and thus no outlet can profitably
deviate by reporting some rj < r`∗ (q). If even one outlet deviates by reporting some
rj > r`∗ (q), then the voter would elect the incumbent, making this deviation never profitable.
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It follows that the strategies and beliefs in Corollary 2 constitute an equilibrium of the
communication subgame Γ̂M .

B.2

Alternative Payoffs of the Media Outlet

This section considers two variations of the media outlet’s payoff. Under the first payoff
configuration, the media outlet obtains political gains that depend solely on the candidates’
policies, and not on the realized state. In this case, the state denotes traits relevant
to citizens but not to a media organization that only cares about policies. The second
configuration considers a media outlet with preferences over policies similar to those of the
representative voter. The analysis of the first configuration is instrumental to studying
the second configuration. I show that the core qualitative results obtained in the baseline
model are robust to these variations.
Purely Ideological Media. Consider the case where the media outlet’s political gains
are purely policy-dependent. That is, the media outlet obtains −γ(ϕm − qb )2 − k(r − θ)2
when reporting r in state θ and the voter elects candidate b ∈ {i, c}. Given policies q, the
amount of resources that the media outlet is willing to use for misreporting information is
ˆ = |τm (q)|. As in the baseline
at most |τm (q)|. Hereafter, I denote this amount with ξ(q)
model, the outlet has no incentive to misreport information when qi = qc , for in this case
we have that ξˆ = 0. In contrast with the payoff used in Section 3, here the political gains
ˆ are not fixed but they are proportional to the distance |qi − qc |. Since the voter knows
ξ(q)
ˆ
ξ(q),
the analysis of the communication subgame remains essentially unaltered.51
ˆ = |τm (q)|. Hereafter, I refer
I now turn to study the policy-making stage when ξ(q)
to the analysis previously performed in Appendix A.2. Consider the challenger’s “best
response to the left,” with qc ≤ qi and qi > ϕm (when qi = ϕm the best response to the
ˆ = τm (q) ≥ 0. Recall that, in equilibrium,
left is qc = ϕm ). In this case, we have that ξ(q)
p
the challenger wins the election when θ < h(r∗ (q)), where h(r∗ (q)) = τv (q) + 12 τm (q)/k.
Differently than the case where the media outlet’s gains ξ are fixed, now the derivative
dh(r∗ (q))
is not always positive. Since h(r∗ (q)) is concave in qc , h(r∗ (·)) has a maximum
dqc
∗
when qc is such that dh(rdqc(q)) = 0. Therefore, the challenger maximizes her payoff when qc
∗
is such that dh(rdqc(q)) = 0. In particular, we have that
dh(r∗ (q))
1
= 2γ(ϕv − qc ) +
|
{z
} 4k
dqc
≥0
|

s

k
2γ(ϕm − qc ) .
τm (q)
{z
}
≤0

51

In this case, the score τm (q) cannot be interpreted as the media’s preference threshold: given policies,
the outlet has a preferred candidate that is independent of the state. As a result, we can have that
the lowest and highest misreporting types are l(r) < τm (q) < h(r0 ) given reports r0 < τm (q) < r. The
“influential news” condition (Corollary A.1), which in the baseline model is φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 , here
depends on k in such a way that φ → +∞ as k → 0+ . In this case, it can be assumed that Θ = R and f
is the improper uniform. However, φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 remains a sufficient condition.
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When

dh(r∗ (qi ,qc∗ ))
dqc

= 0, then the solution qc∗ implicitly satisfies
ϕv − qc∗
1
=
qc∗ − ϕm
4k

s

k
.
τm (qi , qc∗ )

The left-hand side of the above equation is always positive for qc ∈ (ϕm , ϕv ), it is decreasing
in qc , and it has a vertical asymptote at ϕm . In particular, the LHS goes to ∞ as qc ↓ ϕm .
The right-hand side of the above equation is always positive, increasing in qc , and it has
a vertical asymptote such that the RHS goes to ∞ as qc ↑ qi . Therefore, the solution
to the above equation is some qc∗ ∈ (ϕm , qi ). The challenger is strictly better off when
best replying to the left with qc∗ < qi rather than by imitating the incumbent and getting
h(r∗ (qi , qi )) = 0. As a result, it must be that Vc (qi , qc∗ ) = h(r∗ (qi , qc∗ )) > 0. In contrast
with the baseline model, the challenger does not “best reply to the left” to some qi > ϕm
with the outlet’s preferred policy ϕm , even when k is relatively small.52
The analysis of the “best response to the right” BRcR (qi ), where qc ≥ qi , is similar (see
ˆ = −τm (q) ≥ 0 and, in equilibrium,
also Appendix A.2.1). In this case, we have that ξ(q)
p
the challenger wins when θ < l(r∗ (q)) = τv (q)− 12 −τm (q)/k. Therefore, as in the analysis
∗
∗
in Appendix A.2.1, we still have that dl(rdqc(q)) = dh(rdqc(q)) . The incumbent never finds it
optimal to propose qi = ϕm when k is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the challenger can
best respond to the right with some BRcR (ϕm ) ∈ (ϕm , ϕv ] and get Vc (ϕm , BRcR (ϕm )) =
l(r∗ (ϕm , BRcR (ϕm ))). When k is sufficiently high, l(r∗ (ϕm , BRcR (ϕm ))) > Vc (qi , BRc (qi ))
for any qi ∈ (ϕm , ϕv ]. Since Vi = −Vc , the incumbent is better off with some qi > ϕm .
As in the baseline model, the incumbent seeks to minimize the challenger’s expected
payoff. From the above analysis, we know that when qi > ϕm the challenger can secure an
expected payoff of Vc (qi , BRcL (qi )) > 0 with BRcL (qi ) 6= qi . By proposing policies that are
closer to ϕv , the incumbent increases the challenger’s payoff from best responding to the left.
To see this, consider qi0 > qi such that ϕm ≤ qi < qi0 ≤ ϕv . When the incumbent proposes
qi0 , the challenger has the option of proposing a qc0 ∈ (BRcL (qi ), qi0 ) such that qi0 − qc0 =
qi − BRcL (qi ). This strategy maintains unaltered the distance |τv (q) − τm (q)| ∝ |qc − qi |, it
ˆ = τm (q), and it also increases the voter’s threshold
increases the outlet’s political gains ξ(q)
τv (q). Therefore, Vc (qi0 , qc0 ) = h(r∗ (qi0 , qc0 )) > h(r∗ (qi , BRcL (qi ))) = Vc (qi , BRcL (qi ))) > 0. It
follows that Vc (qi , BRcL (qi )) is increasing with qi .
To sum up, when costs k are sufficiently high, then the incumbent would optimally
propose a policy qi∗ (k) > ϕm . The challenger always best replies to qi∗ (k) > ϕm with a
different policy qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k) 6= qi∗ (k). As long as costs k are high enough but finite, the
candidates propose different policies in equilibrium.
The extent to which the media outlet can persuade the voter depends on the ratio
ˆ
ξ(q)/k.
When misreporting costs grow arbitrarily large, k → +∞, the outlet always
52

h
i
p
Notice that h(r∗ (qi , qc = ϕm )) = (ϕm − qi ) γ(ϕv − ϕm + ϕv − qi ) + γ/4k < 0.
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reveals the state and the policies of both candidates converge to ϕv . By contrast, when
k → 0+ , the policies of both candidates converge to ϕm . To see this, suppose that
qi = ϕm and qc ∈ (ϕm , ϕv ]. No matter how close qi and qc are, the outlet obtains
full persuasion when costs k are low enough. Therefore, the incumbent wins when
θ > l(r∗ (ϕm , qc )), where l(r∗ (ϕm , qc )) ≤ τm (ϕm , qc ) < 0 for sufficiently low k. The
expected payoff of the challenger is lower than the payoff she would get by proposing ϕm
as well, Vc (ϕm , qc ) < 0 = Vc (ϕm , ϕm ). In this case, the incumbent can secure a payoff
of at least 0 by proposing ϕm . As we have seen before, any qi > ϕm would grant the
incumbent a negative payoff, even for small k. Therefore, when costs k are sufficiently
low, candidates optimally propose qi = qc = ϕm .
We obtain that equilibrium policies converge to ϕv as k → +∞, to ϕm as k → 0+ ,
and diverge otherwise for intermediate levels of k, with qi∗ (k) 6= qc∗ (qi∗ (k), k). As in the
main analysis, policy divergence implies an increased conflict of interest between the
media outlet and the voter, and thus more misreporting and persuasion.53 Low costs k
imply that there is no misreporting and persuasion, but also that there is a large policy
distortion as q = (ϕm , ϕm ). For high but finite level of k, policies diverge generating
misreporting and persuasion.
The Media as a Voter. Here, I consider the case where the media outlet has
preferences over candidates that are similar to the voter’s. Specifically, the outlet obtains
−γ(ϕm − qi )2 + θ when the voter elects the incumbent, and obtains −γ(ϕm − qc )2 otherwise.
As before, the outlet incurs misreporting costs k(r − θ)2 when delivering report r in state
θ. Given policies q, the political gains that the outlet can seize are therefore determined
by the difference between −γ(ϕm − qi )2 + θ and −γ(ϕm − qc )2 , whereas in the baseline
model such gains are exogenously fixed.
˜ θ) = |τm (q) − θ| the political gains that the media outlet can obtain
Denote by ξ(q,
when policies are q and the realized state is θ. Differently from the baseline model
˜ θ). Nevertheless, the
and its above-studied variation, here the voter does not know ξ(q,
equilibria of the communication subgame are similar to those described in Lemma 1 and in
Proposition A.1. As in the main analysis, I look at the sender-preferred perfect Bayesian
equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion or, alternatively, at the perfect sequential
equilibrium. Suppose that policies are such that τm (q) < τv (q), and consider a report
r > τm (q). Under this payoff specification, the “lowest misreporting type” is
h
i
p
˜l(r) = r + 1 1 − 1 + 4k(r − τm (q)) .
2k
I define with r̃∗ (q) the unique report that satisfy Ef [θ|˜l(r̃∗ (q)) < θ < r̃∗ (q)] = τv (q). Since
the prior f is uniform, it must be that r̃∗ (q) − τv (q) = τv (q) − ˜l(r̃∗ (q)). In equilibrium,
53

Notice that, for this argument, it is irrelevant whether the challenger best responds to the left or to
the right. Therefore, the results are robust to the challenger’s tie breaking rule.
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the outlet reports r̃∗ (q) when θ ∈ (˜l(r̃∗ (q)), r̃∗ (q)), and reports truthfully otherwise. The
voter’s beliefs are as in Proposition A.1. The equilibrium is similar when policies are such
that τm (q) > τv (q), where the “highest misreporting type” is defined for a r < τm (q) as
h̃(r) = r −

i
p
1 h
1 − 1 + 4k(τm (q) − r) .
2k

In this case, the pooling report r̃∗ (q), defined as the unique report such that Ef [θ|r̃∗ (q) <
θ < h̃(r̃∗ (q))] = τv (q), is delivered when θ ∈ (r̃∗ (q), h̃(r̃∗ (q))). Otherwise, the outlet
reports truthfully. Corollary A.1 applies to this case as well, and therefore the “influential
news” condition is φ ≥ 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 .
I now turn to study the equilibrium in the policy-making stage. As before, the goal
here is to show that for intermediate values of k the candidates propose different policies.
To this end, suppose first that qi > ϕm . In the previous extension where the media outlet
is purely policy-motivated, the challenger could “best reply to the left” by proposing a
qc∗ ∈ (ϕm , qi ) and inducing h(r∗ (qi , qc∗ )) > 0. Consider this pair of policies q = (qi , qc∗ ) and
˜ θ) ≶ ξ(q)
ˆ when θ ≷ 0 and ξ(q,
˜ θ) = ξ(q)
ˆ when θ = 0. Therefore, it has
notice that ξ(q,
to be that 0 < h̃(r̃∗ (qi , qc∗ )) < h(r∗ (qi , qc∗ )) and r̃∗ (qi , qc∗ ) > r∗ (qi , qc∗ ). Suppose by way of
contradiction that h̃(r̃∗ (qi , qc∗ )) ≤ 0. When θ = , for some  > 0 small enough, we have
˜ ) ≈ ξ(q).
ˆ
ξ(q,
Since r̃∗ (qi , qc∗ ) > r∗ (qi , qc∗ ), at state θ =  the outlet would rather deliver
r̃∗ (qi , qc∗ ) and induce the election of the challenger rather than report truthfully and let
the incumbent win. Therefore, it must be that h̃(r̃∗ (qi , qc∗ )) > 0. This implies that, for
any finite k, the challenger can secure at least Vc (qi , qc∗ ) > 0 by proposing qc∗ < qi when
qi > ϕm . Similarly, when qi = ϕm there is a finite k high enough such that, for some
qc ∈ (ϕm , ϕv ], ˜l(r̃∗ (ϕm , qi )) > 0, meaning that for sufficiently high k the challenger prefers
to separate from the incumbent by proposing a policy that is relatively more appealing to
the voter.54 Therefore, the candidates optimally propose different policies when costs k
are finite and high enough.
The analysis of the cases where k → +∞ and k → 0+ is similar as that for a purely
policy-motivated outlet: when misreporting costs grow arbitrarily large, k → +∞, the
outlet always reveals the state and the policies of both candidates converge to ϕv ; when
misreporting costs shrink55 to zero, k → 0+ , policies converge to ϕm .
The rest of this section proceeds by showing that higher costs levels can be associated
with more misreporting and persuasion, and yet make the voter better off. In the case
of a purely policy motivated media, we have seen that Vc (qi , BRcL (qi )) is increasing in qi .
The same line of reasoning holds when the outlet has a payoff that is similar to the voter’s.
Moreover, a similar procedure shows that Vc (qi , BRcR (qi )) increases as qi decreases. The
This result follows from the observation that ˜l and r̃∗ vary monotonically and continuously with k,
and limk→+∞ ˜l(r̃∗ (q)) = limk→+∞ r̃∗ (q) = τv (q) > 0.
55
For any q such that ϕv ≥ qc > qi ≥ ϕm , we have that limk→0+ ˜l(r̃∗ (q)) = τm (q) < 0 .
54
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functions h̃, ˜l, r̃∗ , τm , and τv are continuous with respect to their arguments. Therefore,
the best responses BRcL and BRcR , and the payoff Vc are also continuous with respect to
the costs k and policies qi , qc .
The incumbent’s optimal policy qi∗ (k) is set to minimize the challenger’s gain from best
responding. We have seen that higher qi are associated with a higher Vc (qi , BRcL (qi )) and a
lower Vc (qi , BRcR (qi )). When k is sufficiently large so that qi∗ (k) > ϕm , the optimal policy
of the incumbent qi∗ (k) must be such that Vc (qi∗ (k), BRcL (qi∗ (k))) = Vc (qi∗ (k), BRcR (qi∗ (k))).
Since the best responses and the payoffs Vc are continuous with respect to their arguments,
it follows that qi∗ (k) is continuous with respect to k.
Policy convergence to (ϕv , ϕv ) as k → +∞ means that there is a k 0 large enough such
that |ϕv − qj∗ | < ∆ for j ∈ {i, c} and ∆ > 0. Say that qj∗ (k 0 ) = min{qi∗ (k 0 ), qc∗ (qi∗ (k 0 ), k 0 )}
is the most distorted equilibrium policy when misreporting costs are k 0 . A lower bound for
the expected payoff of the voter when costs are k 0 is −γ(ϕv − qj∗ (k 0 ))2 . This lower bound
is calculated by assuming that the voter obtains no informational gains and implements
the most distorted equilibrium policy. By contrast, when k → 0+ the voter’s expected
payoff is −γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 + φ/4. By setting φ = 3γ(ϕv − ϕm )2 , we obtain that the voter is
better off at k 0 provided that qj∗ (k 0 ) > 12 (ϕv + ϕm ). Because of policy convergence to ϕv ,
there is always a finite k 0 such that the condition is satisfied. Since for finite but relatively
large costs k 0 we have that qi∗ (k 0 ) 6= qc∗ (qi∗ (k 0 ), k 0 ), we have that at k 0 there is misreporting
and persuasion. Nevertheless, the voter is strictly better off at k 0 than when k → 0+ .
To sum up, when costs k are sufficiently low there is policy convergence to ϕm , and thus
no misreporting and persuasion; for intermediate levels of k there is policy divergence and
persuasion takes place on the equilibrium path with positive probability; when k → +∞
there is policy convergence to ϕm , and thus no misreporting and persuasion. Higher levels
of misreporting costs can yield more misreporting and persuasion, and yet make the voter
better off. Therefore, qualitative results obtained in this section are similar to those
obtained in the baseline model.

B.3

Equilibrium of the Communication Subgame

Lemma B.1. The sender-preferred generic equilibrium of Γ̂, where λ = τv , is also the
unique perfect sequential equilibrium (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986) of Γ̂.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium (ρ, p) of the communication subgame. Define the set K
containing all types in Θ that are better off relative to the proposed equilibrium when
they deliver an off path report r0 , provided that beliefs are p0 rather than p. Say that
beliefs p0 are consistent if, following r0 , they are the conditional distribution of the outlet’s
type given that the outlet is drawn from the set K. An equilibrium (ρ, p) fails to be
perfectly sequential if there exist such a set of types K and consistent beliefs p0 . A formal
definition of perfect sequential equilibrium is provided by (S. Grossman & Perry, 1986).
48
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Since the concept of perfect sequential equilibrium (PSE) is stronger than the Intuitive
Criterion, every PBE of the communication subgame that is eliminated by the Intuitive
Criterion
is not perfectly
sequential. Consider now a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with
h
i
p
λ ∈ τv , τv + 12 ξ/k , as in Proposition A.1. I define K(r, λ) as the set of types that
would gain by delivering an off-path report r were the voter reply by electing the incumbent
rather than the challenger. Proposition A.1 tells us that off path reports are in the set
(l(r̂(λ)), r̂(λ)), where r̂(λ) is defined in point i) of the same proposition. Formally, by
the definition of lowest misreporting type l(r) and the properties of C(·), we obtain that
K(r, λ) = (l(r), ϑ(r, λ)), where
ϑ(r, λ) = {θ0 |C(r, θ0 ) = C(r̂(λ), θ0 ) and r < θ0 < r̂(λ)} .


i
p
Notice that r̂(τv ) ∈ (l(r̂(λ)), r̂(λ)) for every λ ∈ τv , τv +
ξ/k , and thus r̂(τv ) is
always off-path in these equilibria. Given that Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv )), r̂(τv ))] = τv (see
Proposition A.1), it follows that E
f [θ|θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv )),iϑ(r̂(τv ), λ))] > τv . Suppose that, in a
p
generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ ∈ τv , τv + 12 ξ/k , upon observing the off-path report
r̂(τv ) the voter conjectures that such a report has been delivered by types of sender
in the set K(r̂(τv ), λ). The voter’s updated “consistent” beliefs pK are the conditional
distribution of the outlet’s type given that θ ∈ K(r̂(τv ), λ). That is, pK is a uniform
distribution with full support in K(r̂(τv ), λ). Given beliefs pK , the voter casts a ballot for
the incumbent, as EpK [θ] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv )), ϑ(r̂(τv ), λ))] > τv . This makes a deviation
to r̂(τv ) profitable
only fori types θ ∈ K(r̂(τv ), λ). Therefore, all generic equilibria of Γ̂

p
with λ ∈ τv , τv + 12 ξ/k are not perfectly sequential. Finally, consider the generic
equilibrium with λ = τv . In this case, every off-path report r0 ∈ (l(r̂(τv )), r̂(τv )) induces
consistent beliefs such that EpK [θ] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ (l(r0 ), ϑ(r0 ), λ)] < τv , and the voter casts
a ballot for the challenger after observing r0 . No type of sender would benefit from
delivering any off-path report r0 ∈ (l(r̂(τv )), r̂(τv )), and thus this equilibrium is perfectly
sequential. Therefore, the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ = τv is the only perfect
sequential equilibrium of Γ̂.
1
2

Lemma B.2. The undefeated (Mailath et al., 1993) generic equilibrium of Γ̂ is unique
and it has λ = τv .
Proof. Denote the set of generic equilibria of Γ̂ with GE(Γ̂) (see Proposition A.1). With
a slight abuse of notation, say that um (ρ, p, λ, θ) denotes the media outlet’s payoff in the
generic equilibrium (ρ, p) with parameter λ and when the state is θ. From Mailath et al.
(1993), (ρ, p) ∈ GE(Γ̂) defeats (ρ0 , p0 ) ∈ GE(Γ̂) if there exists a report r ∈ Θ such that
(i) ρ0 (θ) 6= r for every θ ∈ Θ, and κ(r) ≡ {θ ∈ Θ|ρ(θ) = r} 6= ∅; (ii) for every θ ∈ κ(r),
um (ρ, p, λ, θ) ≥ um (ρ0 , p0 , λ, θ), with the inequality being strict for some θ ∈ κ(r); (iii)
there is some θ ∈ κ(r) such that p0 (θ|r) is different from the conditional probability that
the state is in κ(r).
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Consider now the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ = τv , and notice that
r̂(τv ) is
i
p
off-path in every other generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ0 ∈ τv , τv + 12 ξ/k . For every
θ ∈ (l(r̂(τv )), r̂(τv )), we have that um (·, λ = τv , θ) = ξ − kC(r̂(τv ), θ) > um (·, λ0 , θ) as
either um (·, λ0 , θ) = 0 or um (·, λ0 , θ) = ξ − kC(r̂(λ0 ), θ). Finally, Ef [θ|θ ∈ κ(r̂(τv ))] = τv ,
and therefore p0 (θ|r̂(τv )) must differ from the conditional probability of θ ∈ κ(r̂(τv )) for
the voter to select the challenger upon observing r̂(τv ) in generic equilibria with λ0 6= τv .
Hence, the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with λ = τv defeats every other generic equilibria of Γ̂.
0
Reports in (l(r̂(τ
the only reports that are on-path in a generic equilibv )), l(r̂(λ ))) are i
p
1
0
rium of Γ̂ with λ ∈ τv , τv + 2 ξ/k but not when λ = τv . In all these generic equilibria,
upon observing a r0 ∈ (l(r̂(τv )), l(r̂(λ0 ))) the voter casts a ballot for the challenger. Therefore, no generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with parameter λ0 can defeat the one with λ = τv .
Hence, the generic equilibrium of Γ̂ with parameter λ = τv is the only undefeated generic
equilibrium of the communication subgame.
Corollary B.1. The set of equilibrium
h payoffs that
i the voter can obtain in a PBE robust
∗
to the Intuitive Criterion is W(k) = Wv (k), Ŵv , where Wv∗ (k) is as in equation (4) and
Ŵv = φ/4 is the full-information welfare.
Proof. By definition, equation (4) describes the lowest payoff the voter can receive in
a PBE robust to the Intuitive Criterion. As assumed in Appendix A.2.2, suppose that
the challenger selects the voter’s least preferred policy when indifferent, and consider
a generic equilibrium of Γ̂ as in Proposition A.1. By the continuity of l(r) and h(r)
with respect to r, and of r∗ (λ) with respect to λ, we
voter’s
h obtain that the
i equilibrium
p
welfare is continuously (weakly) increasing in λ ∈ τv (q), τv (q) + 12 ξ/k : for higher λ,
the set of states in which persuasion occurs (weakly) shrinks and both the incumbent
and the challenger’s policies get (weakly) closer to the voter’s bliss policy ϕv . When
p
λ = τv (q) + 12 ξ/k there is no persuasion at all, and the voter always votes for her
preferred candidate as if under complete information. Since the media outlet has no
persuasive power, the median voter theorem holds and both candidates propose ϕv . In
this case the voter’s welfare is Ŵv = φ/4, and therefore
h in a PBE
i robust to the Intuitive
∗
Criterion the voter can obtain any payoff in the set Wv (k), Ŵv .

B.4

Simultaneous Policy-making and Information Withholding

Lemma B.3. Suppose that candidates propose policies simultaneously. Then, if k ≤ k̄/4
there is an equilibrium where both policies converge to ϕm .
Proof. Consider a variation of the model in Section 3 such that candidates propose policies simultaneously rather than sequentially. Suppose that there is an equilibrium where
q 0 = (ϕm , ϕm ), and notice that τv (q 0 ) = τm (q 0 ) = Vj (q 0 ) = 0, j ∈ {i, c}. A deviation by the
challenger to some qc > ϕm cannot be profitable if Vc (ϕm , qc ) = l(r∗ (ϕm , qc )) ≤ 0, where
50
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p
l(r∗ (ϕm , qc )) = max{r∗ (ϕm , qc ) − ξ/k, τm (ϕm , qc )} and r∗ (ϕm , qc ) = min{τv (ϕm , qc ) +
p
1
ξ/k, 2τv (ϕm , qc )−τm (ϕm , qc )}. Since for a qc ∈ (ϕm , ϕv ) we have that ∂τm (ϕm , qc )/∂qc <
2
0 < ∂τv (ϕm , qc )/∂qc , and ∂τv (ϕm , qc )/∂qc = 0 when qc = ϕv , the challenger’s payoff
Vc (ϕm , qc ) has a maximum either at qc = ϕm or at qc = ϕv . The condition Vc (ϕm , ϕv ) ≤ 0
gives us k ≤ ξ/4γ 2 (ϕv − ϕm )4 = k̄/4. Therefore, when k ≤ k̄/4 there is an equilibrium
where policies converge to (ϕm , ϕm ).
Lemma B.4. Suppose that candidates propose policies simultaneously. Then, there is no
pure strategy equilibrium in the policy-making stage when k ≥ k̄, with k finite.
Proof. Suppose that candidates propose policies simultaneously and that k ≥ k̄. Since
candidates are symmetric, their best response functions are symmetric as well. From
Proposition A.2 the best response of the challenger to a qi is either ϕv or qi − η(k). Since
qj − η(k) is always below the qj line for every finite k ≥ k̄, a pure strategy equilibrium
of the policy-making stage must have one of the two candidates proposing ϕv . Suppose
that qi = ϕv , and therefore BRc (ϕv ) = ϕv − η(k). From Proposition A.2 we obtain that
p
BRi (BRc (ϕv )) = ϕv only if ϕv −η(k) ≤ ϕv +η(k)− 4 ξ/γ 2 k. By rearranging and plugging
p
p
p
η(k) = ξ/k/4γ(ϕv − ϕm ), we obtain the condition 4 ξ/γ 2 k ≤ ξ/k/2γ(ϕv − ϕm ). Such
a condition is not satisfied at k = k̄, and therefore it is not satisfied for any finite k > k̄.
Lemma B.5. There is no perfectly sequential equilibrium of the communication subgame
where the outlet achieves persuasion by withholding information at a cost ω > 0.
Proof. Consider a variant of the baseline model where the outlet can withhold information
by delivering an empty report ∅ at a cost ω > 0. I use “silence” and “withholding
information” interchangeably. Suppose that there is a perfect sequential equilibrium (ρ, p)
where ∅ is on path with β(∅) = i. This means that ω < ξ, for otherwise withholding
information would always be prohibitively expensive. Consider the case where τm (q) <
τv (q). Recall that the report r∗ (q) is defined in Lemma 1 as
n
o
p
r∗ (q) = min τv (q) + 21 ξ/k, 2τv (q) − τm (q) .
In every perfect sequential equilibrium, the report r∗ (q) must be on path. Suppose
not. Equilibrium beliefs p must assign β(r∗ (q)) = c, for otherwise outlet’s type θ =
r∗ (q) would be strictly better off by reporting truthfully. Consider alternative beliefs
p0 assigning β(r∗ (q)) = i. Denote with K the set of types that would be better off
relative to the proposed equilibrium when reporting r∗ (q) under beliefs p0 . If some
type θ0 ∈ (τm (q), r∗ (q)) gains by reporting r∗ (q) under beliefs p0 , then also all types
θ ∈ (θ0 , r∗ (q)] do so. From the definition of l(r), the set K includes [θ̂, r∗ (q)] for some
θ̂ ∈ (max{l(r∗ (q)), τm (q)}, r∗ (q)). Say that beliefs p0 are consistent in the sense that
p0 (θ|r∗ (q)) is the conditional distribution of the outlet’s type given that the outlet is drawn
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from the set K. Then, since Ef [θ|θ ∈ (max{l(r∗ (q)), τm (q)}, r∗ (q))] = τv (q) (Lemma 1),
it follows that Ep0 [θ|θ ∈ K] = Ef [θ|θ ∈ K] ≥ τv (q), and thus we have that β(r∗ (q)) = i
under p0 . Given that such a set K and consistent beliefs p0 exist, an equilibrium cannot
be perfectly sequential if r∗ (q) is off path.
Therefore, r∗ (q) is on path, and beliefs must assign β(r∗ (q)) = i. To see this, suppose
instead that r∗ (q) is on path but β(r∗ (q)) = c. Since β(∅) = i and C(∅, θ) = ω < ξ,
the report r∗ (q) is strictly dominated by ∅ for every θ ≥ τm (q). Hence, it must be that
ρ(θ) = r∗ (q) for some θ < τm (q). However, this case is ruled out by Lemma A.3. Therefore,
in every perfect sequential equilibrium r∗ (q) is on path with β(r∗ (q)) = i. Define by θ̃ the
state θ̃ < r∗ (q) such that kC(r∗ (q), θ̃) = ω. Given that β(r∗ (q)) = i, in this equilibrium
types θ ∈ (max{θ̃, τm (q)}, r∗ (q)] do not withhold information, as they are strictly better
off by reporting r∗ (q) than by delivering ∅. From the proof of Lemma A.5 we obtain that
all types θ ≥ r∗ (q) report truthfully and induce the election of the incumbent at no cost.56
Define the set of all types that withhold information with S := {θ ∈ Θ | ρ(θ) = ∅}.
It must be that ρ(θ, q) 6= ∅ for every θ ≤ τm (q), as the outlet is strictly better off by
reporting truthfully in those states. Therefore, inf S ≥ τm (q) and, to have β(∅) = i,
beliefs p must be such that Ep [θ|θ ∈ S] ≥ τv (q). The set of types that stays silent in a
perfect sequential equilibrium is S ⊆ (τm (q), θ̃], where it must be that θ̃ > τm (q).
Since Ef [θ|θ ∈ (max{l(r∗ (q)), τm (q)}, r∗ (q))] = τv (q) (Lemma 1) and θ̃ < r∗ (q), it
follows that Ef [θ|θ ∈ (τm (q), θ̃]] < τv (q). Hence, it must be that ρ(θ0 , q) 6= ∅ for some
θ0 ∈ (τm (q), τv (q)] to have β(∅) = i. Since silence comes at a cost ω < ξ, it must be that
ρ(θ0 , q) = r0 for some r0 such that k(r0 − θ0 )2 < ω and β(r0 ) = i. To have β(r0 ) = i, it must
be that r0 is delivered also by some types θ > τv (q). Because the cost function is quadratic,
the set of types delivering r0 and such that k(r0 − θ0 )2 < ω must be convex, and there can
be only one report r0 that is delivered by a convex set of types containing τv (q). Denote
with [θ, θ] the set of types that deliver r0 , that is, [θ, θ] = {θ ∈ Θ|ρ(θ, q) = r0 }. It must
be that τm (q) < θ < τv (q) and θ̃ ≥ θ > τv (q). In equilibrium, β(r0 ) = i is possible only
if Ef [θ|θ ∈ [θ, θ]] ≥ τv (q), which is satisfied provided that θ ≥ 2τv (q) − θ. This implies
that θ > r0 ≥ τv (q). Moreover, r0 must be such that in equilibrium no type θ < θ or
θ > θ finds it convenient to deliver r0 . In addition, it must be that β(r) = c for every
r ∈ [θ, θ] \ {r0 }. As a result, all reports r ∈ [θ, θ] \ {r0 } must be off path. However, any
off-path report r00 > r0 is equilibrium-dominated by all θ ≤ r0 , yielding B(J(r00 ), r00 ) = i.
Therefore, this equilibrium does not pass the Intuitive Criterion test, and thus it is not
perfectly sequential. The proof is analogous for the case τm (q) > τv (q). As a result, there
is no perfect sequential equilibrium where the outlet achieves persuasion by withholding
information when doing so comes at a positive cost, no matter how small.
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Lemmata A.3 and A.5 use the Intuitive Criterion test. Since the notion of perfect sequential
equilibrium is more restrictive than the Intuitive Criterion, the lemmata can be applied without loss.
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